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My thesis explores the following question: how workers of different skill are
allocated across jobs and unemployment over the business cycle. I am interested
in understanding the “over-qualification”of workers that occurs during periods of
high unemployment, as increased congestion in the labor market hinders workers
from finding a suitable match. I focus on the skill mismatch that takes the form
of high-skilled workers transitorily accepting low-skill jobs, thereby influencing the
labor market prospects of low-skilled workers.
In the first chapter, I develop a business cycle matching model with hetero-
geneous workers and jobs, which helps understand the role of over-qualification on
labor productivity and across-skill unemployment dynamics. I capture the across-
skill search externalities and spillover effects that arise when low- and high-skilled
workers compete for low-skill jobs, by relaxing the common assumption that all
workers qualify for any type of vacancy. I show that the skill mix of vacancies
changes over the cycle, thus altering the allocation of workers of different skill across
jobs and unemployment. In addition, my model explains observed differences in la-
bor market outcomes of different skill groups, including the higher sensitivity of
low-skilled unemployment to changes in economic activity.
In the second chapter, I test the empirical relevance of over-qualification. I ask
whether the risk of unemployment induces high-skilled workers to accept transitorily
low-skill jobs until a better job comes along. To this end, I study the mismatch
rates and job level dynamics of high-skilled workers. Unlike existing studies that
only examine how the business cycle affects job level probabilities, I adopt dynamic
panel data estimation methods, in which the worker’s lagged state (i.e., whether
unemployed or mismatched) enters the model as an explanatory variable.
I find evidence suggestive of the existence of over-qualification. The mismatch
rates of higher educational groups are higher and exhibit more cyclical variation.
Moreover, I find that high-skilled workers are more likely to move into lower job
levels when they are unemployed and the unemployment rate is high. In addition,
my results point to the existence of an upgrading in the job levels of mismatched
high-skilled workers when the unemployment rate is low.
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Chapter 1
Job Competition Over the Business Cycle: Implications for Labor
Productivity and Unemployment Rates by Skill
1.1 Introduction
An open theoretical question is how the quality of job-worker matches evolves
over the business cycle. Evidence that matches created during recessions are of
lower productivity and dissolve faster has increased attention on the role of search
frictions in exacerbating skill-mismatches during recessions.1
This chapter focuses on the type of skill-mismatch that takes the form of high-
skilled workers taking transitorily low-skill jobs, i.e., becoming “over-qualified”, in
order to avoid the distress of being unemployed, while continuing to search on the job
for high-skill jobs. I analyze the implications of over-qualification for unemployment
and labor productivity dynamics, by developing a business cycle matching model in
which high-skilled workers can take both high- and low-skill jobs, whereas low-skilled
workers can only take low-skilled jobs.
1For evidence on the procyclicality of match quality, see for example, Bowlus (1995), Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), Bils (1985), Shin (1994), Bowlus, Liu and Robinson (2002), and Liu
(2003). Moreover, worker surveys indicate that workers are more likely to report being employed
at jobs below their skill level during recessions (e.g., Akerlof Rose and Yellen, 1988; and Acemoglu,
1999).
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The existing literature on the role of search frictions in exacerbating skill
mismatch during recessions neglects the fact that workers face restrictions in the type
of vacancies they can fill. Existing studies assume that all workers, independent of
their skill level, qualify for any type of vacancy firms create. In reality, however, the
matching technology is asymmetric: workers of high skill qualify for a wider range
of job types, while jobs with low skill requirements can be filled by a wider range of
worker types. Hence, when low-skilled workers compete with high-skilled workers
for low-skilled jobs, the asymmetric nature of the matching technology entails search
externalities and across-skill spillover effects that existing studies fail to incorporate.
In turn, the job competition externalities that arise have important consequences
for how workers of different skill are allocated across jobs and unemployment over
the cycle.
Typically, workers of different skill experience different labor market outcomes
on a variety of dimensions, which the assumption that all workers can be employed
in any type of vacancies firms create (i.e., a single job-worker matching rate for all
skill groups) cannot explain. Low-skilled workers have lower exit rates from un-
employment and lower propensity to search on the job than high-skilled workers
(e.g., Blau and Robins, 1990; Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1994; and Belzil, 1996).
Moreover, low-skilled unemployment is higher and exhibits higher cyclical sensitivity
than high-skilled unemployment (e.g., Topel, 1993). These differences in labor mar-
ket outcomes for workers of different skill, are consistent with the existence of job
competition externalities, as high-skilled workers take temporary jobs below their
2
skill level, thereby affecting the labor market prospects of low-skilled workers.2
There is increasing interest in modeling over-qualification to explain why many
EU countries in the recent decades have suffered an uneven increase in low-skilled
unemployment relative to high-skilled unemployment (Albrecht and Vroman, 2002;
Gautier, 2002; Dolado et al., 2003). These studies focus on across-skill job compe-
tition externalities and investigate whether high-skilled workers “crowd-out” low-
skilled workers as they compete for jobs. Since their goal is to explain long term
uneven developments in unemployment rates, they only look at steady states.
The notion that search frictions exacerbate skill-mismatches during recessions
has been formalized in Barlevy (2002), via a business cycle matching model with two-
sided heterogeneity and on-the-job search. Prior to Barlevy, a series of theoretical
papers argued that recessions promote efficient allocation of resources by “cleansing”
out the less efficient production arrangements.3 However, the “cleansing” view is
at odds with the evidence that recessions encourage the creation of less productive
matches. Barlevy (2002) is a first attempt at reconciling the theoretical literature
on the “cleansing” effect of recessions with the evidence. In his model recessions kill
marginal production arrangements, but also hinder the transition of mismatched
workers into more productive uses (labeled as the “sullying” effect), because firms
2The findings of Bowlus (1995) that the quality of matches falls during recessions more evidently
in white collar than blue collar activities gives additional support to this view.
3Examples are Hall (1991, 2000), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Caballero and Hammour
(1994, 1996) and Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (1999). These studies have been inspired by the
work of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), who argue that recessions are associated with increased job
reallocation in the manufacturing sector.
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create fewer vacancies per job seeker. The latter effect dominates, and accounts
for the lower match quality observed during recessions. Barlevy’s model adopts a
symmetric framework (i.e., firms create equal amounts of each type of vacancy and
all workers can be employed in any type of vacancy firms open), making the role
of aggregate shocks more transparent. However, a symmetric framework implies
identical unemployment rates across skill groups, and therefore cannot account for
the observed uneven cyclical fluctuations in unemployment rates of different skill
cohorts. More importantly, it ignores the externalities and spillover effects across
skill groups arising from job competition.
In this paper, I relax the symmetry assumption and incorporate both business
cycle fluctuations and job competition externalities into the model, thus bringing
the two strands of literature together. I investigate the dynamic effects on unem-
ployment of two types of shocks: an exogenous shock to productivity that affects
output of all matches and shock to the rate at which matches dissolve. Given the
asymmetric nature of the matching technology, changes in the skill composition of
vacancies alter the way high- and low-skilled workers are allocated across types of
jobs and unemployment.
I show that the skill composition of vacancies changes over the cycle, as firms
respond to changes in the relative value of opening high- and low-skill vacancies. My
model delivers the conventional result that in periods of low aggregate productivity
workers have greater difficulty escaping unemployment, as firms create fewer vacan-
cies per job seeker, but it also shows that downturns generate two countervailing
effects. On the one hand, an exogenous reduction in aggregate productivity raises
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the relative value of opening high-skill vacancies and encourages firms to upgrade
the skill composition of vacancies. In turn, the skill upgrading in the vacancy mix
facilitates the transition of both unemployed and overqualified (i.e., in low-skill jobs)
high-skilled workers into high-skill jobs, increasing average match productivity. On
the other hand, a rise in exogenous job separation rates induces firms to downgrade
the skill composition of vacancies: since low-skill jobs can be filled by both types
of workers, their relative profitability increases when matches dissolve faster and
thus is a greater supply of job seekers. The skill downgrading, together with the
increase in the number of unemployed high-skilled workers, enhances the likelihood
that unemployed high-skilled workers take low-skill jobs, while stifling the transition
into high-skill jobs. The net effect on the degree of over-qualification and thus aver-
age match productivity depends on the relative importance of exogenous aggregate
productivity and separation rate shocks over the business cycle.
Once I allow for the skill composition of vacancies to vary over the cycle,
Barlevy’s (2002) result that recessions stifle the transition of mismatched workers
into appropriate jobs no longer holds unless the fall in aggregate productivity is
accompanied by a sufficiently high increase in job separation. Further, contrary to
the “cleansing” view, under which higher job separation during recessions eliminates
marginally productive arrangements, higher job separation in this paper actually
exacerbates over-qualification and lowers average match productivity. Hence, my
model gives a view of skill-mismatch over the cycle that puts more emphasis on
job separation rather than aggregate productivity fluctuations, and calls for further
investigation on the link between the two impulses.
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In addition, by relaxing the common assumption of a single matching rate for
all skill groups, my model allows for the unemployment rate not only to vary over
the cycle, but across skill groups as well. Therefore, my model allows for an exami-
nation of why low-skilled unemployment is more sensitive to slowdowns in economic
activity than high-skilled unemployment, and whether this is due to intensified job
competition between high- and low-skilled workers. Consistent with the evidence, I
find that low-skilled unemployment is higher and more volatile than high-skilled un-
employment. However, contrary to the common belief, the main reason is not that
high-skilled workers crowd out low-skilled ones when competing for jobs; instead,
high-skilled workers are eligible for both high- and low-skill jobs and are therefore
less vulnerable to the changes in the skill composition of vacancies that occur over
the cycle. As it turns out, regardless of whether or not over-qualification and job
competition externalities increase during recessions, the low-skilled unemployment
rate still rises relatively more.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 is devoted to the
description of related literature. Section 1.3 describes worker and firm behavior
and the labor market mechanisms (matching process, wage bargaining). In sections
1.4 and 1.5, I examine the properties of the model through comparative statics
and dynamic simulation exercises, by considering separately the effects of aggregate
productivity and separation rate fluctuations. Finally, in section 1.6, I conclude with
a few remarks and discuss how future research will build upon this contribution.
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1.2 Related Literature
Several modifications to the conventional search equilibrium model have been
made to incorporate the significance of skill mismatches which occur during periods
of high congestion in the labor market, mainly by allowing for some heterogeneity
in job productivities and/or workers skills. The literature on matching models with
heterogeneous agents dates back to the contribution by Pissarides (1994), where one-
sided heterogeneity is assumed: there are two types of jobs (good and bad jobs) but
workers are homogeneous. Workers who take bad jobs stay in them as their wages
increase with job tenure, so that employment in good jobs is no longer attractive to
them.4
The more recent contributions of Acemoglu (1999) and Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1999) set up the foundations of the role of search frictions in matching mod-
els with skill heterogeneity. Assuming a constant contact rate between unemployed
workers and vacancies, thus eliminating any possible interactions between workers
with different skills, Acemoglu (1999) offers a theory of how the unemployment rates
of high- and low-skilled workers and between-group wage dispersion change endoge-
nously depending on the vacancy creation strategy of firms. In particular, firms
find it profitable to either create only low-skill jobs or to create both low-skill and
high-skill jobs and search for the appropriate candidates. Similarly, in Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999), the distribution of workers over a continuum of skill levels is
exogenous, whereas the distribution of job types is endogenous. They examine the
4A relevant contribution in this line of research is also McKenna (1996).
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consequences of skilled-biased technological change on unemployment rates across
skill groups. However, they do not deal with across skill search externalities and
spillover effects associated with skill-mismatches, because in their model there is a
perfect match between workers skills and firms skill requirements.
Similar models have also been considered in studies that investigate the role
of unemployment risk in how efficiently workers are allocated across jobs, and the
corresponding welfare implications of unemployment insurance policy. In Acemoglu
(2001), workers are identical and only job productivities are heterogeneous. Sim-
ilarly, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) assume that workers are identical in terms of
their skills, while jobs are heterogeneous in terms of specificity with higher specificity
jobs being more productive. Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) go one step further and
allow for two-sided skill heterogeneity, thus capturing the negative impact that skill
mismatch has on labor productivity. They model match productivity to be lower the
higher the distance between the workers’ skill level and the vacancies’ required skill
level. However, they impose a convenient symmetry in the production technology
that is very restrictive: as long as the distance between the firms required skill level
and the worker’s skill level is the same, the productivity of the match will be equal.
This implies that an overqualified worker can produce as much as an under-qualified
worker (a nurse can do the job of a doctor as well as a doctor can do the job of a
nurse).
Although the strands of literature described above set the foundations for
studying search frictions in models with skill-heterogeneity, they do not deal with
spillover effects of high-skilled workers onto the creation and filling of low-skill jobs
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and their connection to the observed differences in the labor market outcomes of dif-
ferent skill cohorts. Some of these papers assume perfectly segmented labor markets
where job competition and interactions across skill groups are not possible. In other
cases, markets are not segmented, but the type of heterogeneity assumed does not
incorporate differences in the minimum skill requirements of jobs. That is, all types
of workers are qualified to perform any type of job entrepreneurs create and thus
have identical job finding rates. In such a set up, the matching behavior of different
skill groups does not influence the ability of other skill groups to find a job. Hence,
possible job competition and crowding out phenomena that may occur in periods of
high congestion in the labor market, and their implications for unemployment rate
differences across skill groups, are ignored.
The recent contributions by Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Gautier (2002) and
Dolado et al. (2003) extend this type of model to include job competition and
spillover effects across skill groups and address issues such as over-qualification and
crowding-out more directly. In these studies, for simplicity, there are only two types
of jobs (low-skill and high-skill) and only two skill groups (low-skilled and high-
skilled workers). Both the distribution of skills and job destruction are exogenous,
but the vacancy mix is endogenous and is determined by free entry conditions. The
key feature of these models, first introduced by Albrecht and Vroman (2002), is the
type of production technology assumed: low- and high-skill workers can be hired for
low-skill jobs, whereas only the latter can perform high-skill jobs. In this context,
high- and low-skill submarkets can endogenously segregate or merge depending on
the matching behavior of workers. It may be worthwhile for unemployed high-skilled
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workers to mismatch, i.e., take low-skill jobs. If this is the case, job creation and
unemployment in the low-skill market can affect job creation and unemployment in
the high-skill market. Therefore, job competition takes place and crowding out may
occur.5
Although these studies provide important insights into the externalities asso-
ciated with searching and matching behavior of workers and shed some light on the
implications of job competition for unemployment, they are limited in that they only
perform comparative static exercises on the steady-state equilibrium, investigating
5The most notable differences between these three studies rest on their assumptions regarding
the nature of job search. In both Gautier (2002) and Dolado et al. (2003) mismatched workers
(high-skilled workers on low-skilled jobs) are allowed to search on-the-job and quit as soon as
better jobs come along, while in the Albrecht and Vroman model, on-the-job search is not allowed.
In the latter study, there are two main results. First, when high-skilled workers are willing to
take low-skill jobs (cross-skill matching), unemployment duration among low-skilled workers is
higher than among high-skilled workers, while the expected match duration is higher for high-
than low-skill jobs. Second, in equilibria with cross-skill matching, high-skilled workers “crowd
out”, that is, take jobs away from low-skilled workers, but at the same time, their willingness to
accept low-skill jobs leads to an overall expansion of low-skill vacancy supply. Therefore, the net
impact on low-skilled unemployment depends on which of these effects is stronger. Gautier (2002)
and Dolado et al. (2003) find that on-the-job search provides an additional mechanism through
which the labor market position of low-skill workers is weakened when high-skilled workers move
into low-skill jobs. In particular, the higher quit rate of mismatched workers exerts a negative
externality on low-skill jobs, which lowers the value of posting a low-skill vacancy and thus, leads
to lower low-skill vacancy creation. Gautier (2002) additionally argues that job competition may
exert a positive externality on the profits of low-skill vacancies when high-skilled workers are more
productive than low-skilled workers on low-skill jobs.
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how the steady-state equilibrium unemployment rates of low- and high-skilled work-
ers are affected by changes in the aggregate productivity level or the job separation
rate, which represent changes in overall economic activity; changes in the relative
productivity of high and low-skill jobs, which are interpreted as skill-biased techno-
logical shocks; and changes in the mass of high-skilled workers in the economy.6
Comparative static results do not provide insights into the dynamic impact of
shocks. Therefore, the studies described above do not establish a clear connection
between job competition and the observed differences in the cyclical patterns of
unemployment across skill groups. To characterize the allocation of workers across
different types of matches and unemployment over the business cycle, we need to
allow for deviations from the steady state. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) do
precisely this in their model without heterogeneity and only off-the-job search, by
allowing aggregate productivity to fluctuate over time. However, on-the-job search
and heterogeneity make the transitional dynamics associated with deviations from
the steady state difficult to characterize analytically. Barlevy (2002) incorporates
both of these features but turns to a discrete-time version of the model and a col-
location method to approximate the value function in order to analyze transitional
dynamics. His study establishes that recessions exacerbate mismatch while booms
6More recently, Pierrard and Sneesens (2003) examine the dynamic adjustment process to a
skill-bias shock and to skill upgrading by allowing for these changes to take place progressively
over time. Their scope is to investigate how these changes in combination with job competition
externalities affect the dispersion between the high- and low-skilled unemployment rates. However,
they do not look at the cyclical implications of job competition for the across-skill unemployment
dynamics.
11
promote allocative efficiency by allowing mismatched workers to quit and move into
better jobs. The matching technology assumed in Barlevy, however, does not al-
low for the possibility of job competition and the resulting search externalities and
spillover effects across skill groups.7 Moreover, by assuming a symmetric equilibrium
where firms create equal amounts of each type of vacancy, his model predicts that
all types of workers face the same labor market prospects. This is inconsistent with
the evidence that changes in aggregate economic conditions have different impacts
on unemployment flows and rates of different skill groups.
In this paper, I unite the literature examining matching models with skill-
mismatches and business cycles with the recent literature examining matching mod-
els of job competition. The section that follows gives a description of the model.
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Main Assumptions
I assume that time is discrete. An exogenous fraction of workers δ is low-skilled
(l), while the remaining fraction (1− δ) is high-skilled (h). Similarly, vacancies are
high-skill (h) and low-skill (l). The distribution of skill requirement across vacancies
is endogenous.
Interactions between high- and low-skilled submarkets are embedded into the
model by incorporating heterogeneity in terms of jobs’ minimum skill requirements.
Both low- and high-skilled workers can be hired for low-skill jobs, but a high-skill job
7The matching technology in Barlevy is identical to that in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999).
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can be filled only by a high-skilled worker. Consequently, workers of different skill
not only have different productivity distributions across types of jobs but different
job finding rates as well; high-skill workers have a higher job finding rate, while
low-skill vacancies enjoy a higher arrival rate of workers than high-skill vacancies.
High- and low-skilled workers are assumed to be equally productive in low-skill
jobs, but high-skilled workers are more productive when matched to a high-skill
job. The flow output of each match is assumed to be the product of an aggregate
component y, and a match specific component aji , where i denotes the type of job
and j the type of worker. More formally, let yaji denote the flow of output of a job
of type i = (h, l) that is filled by a worker of type j = (h, l). Then, the production
technology assumptions can be summarized by yahh > ya
h
l = ya
l
l > ya
l
h = 0.
Given that job-to-job movements represent a substantial fraction of worker
flows (e.g., Gautier, 1998), I allow for on-the-job search. Mismatched high-skilled
workers search on the job for high-skill jobs and quit as soon as they find one, while
low-skilled workers have no reason to search on the job.
Firms can open at most one job and the choice of type is irreversible. The
mass of each type of vacancy is determined endogenously by a free-entry condition.
The exogenous component of job separation follows a Poisson process with arrival
rate s. Although s is common to both types of job, the effective separation rate of
low-skill jobs is higher due to on-the-job search by mismatched workers. Whenever
a match is destroyed the job becomes vacant and bears a maintenance cost c, while
the worker becomes unemployed and receives a flow of income b, which is to be
interpreted as home production or leisure.
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I introduce productivity and separation rate fluctuations into the model by
allowing aggregate labor productivity y and the separation rate s to follow a Markov
process. Aggregate productivity takes the value of y0 in recessions and y1 > y0 in
booms, while the separation rate takes the value s0 in recessions and s1 < s0 in
booms. Both variables switch between the two levels with a transition probability
p. At every point in time the current values of productivity and separation are
common knowledge.
The condition that ensures a match is formed in equilibrium is simply that the
flow of output generated from the match is higher than the unemployment benefit,
i.e., aji > b, ∀i, j. It is optimal for unemployed high-skilled workers to take low-skill
jobs as long as their productivity is higher than the unemployment benefit, because
they retain their chances of finding a high-skilled job by searching on the job.8
The meeting process is undirected in the sense that a low-skill worker encoun-
ters a high-skill vacancy (in which case a match is not formed) with a probability
per unit of time that is proportional to the fraction of high-skill vacancies. Similarly,
a high-skill worker encounters a low-skill vacancy with a probability per unit of time
that is proportional to the fraction of low-skill vacancies.9
8Dolado et al. (2003) derive conditions that rule out a corner solution in which firms create
only low-skill vacancies in a steady state equilibrium. They also derive the conditions under which
a steady-state cross-skill matching equilibrium (i.e. an equilibrium in which high-skill workers take
low-skill jobs) is unique.
9I assume the meeting process is undirected (i.e., workers cannot distinguish the vacancy type
before applying) to capture the impact of changes in the skill mix of vacancies on the flow rates of
different skill groups. In reality even if job seekers can distinguish the type of vacancy before they
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The total number of matches between a worker and a firm is determined by
a constant returns to scale function, m
[
vh + vl, uh + ul + e
h
l (1− s)
]
, where vh and
vl denote the mass of high- and low-skill vacancies, uh and ul the mass of high-
and low-skilled unemployed workers, and ehl (1-s) the number of high-skilled workers
in low-skill jobs (which I label as mismatched henceforth) that survive separation.
m [·, ·] is strictly increasing in both arguments. The “labor market tightness” is
denoted by θ = vh+vl
uh+ul+e
h
l
(1−s)
, so that in a tighter market there are more vacancies
available per job seeker.
The pool of job seekers is composed of unemployed high- and low-skilled work-
ers and mismatched workers. For convenience, I define the following shares:
ϕ =
ul
ul + uh
ψ =
ul + uh
ul + uh + ehl (1− s)
(1.1)
The rate at which firms meet a job seeker of any type is equal to q(θ) = m(1, 1
θ
),
which is decreasing in θ and exhibits the standard properties of: limθ→0 q (θ) =
limθ→∞ θq (θ) =∞ and limθ→∞ q (θ) = limθ→0 θq (θ) = 0. A mismatched high-skilled
worker has no incentive to change employer unless the new employer offers him a
high-skill job. Accordingly, some low-skill vacancies will meet mismatched workers
who will refuse to match. Likewise, employers with high-skill jobs will not hire
apply there are still search frictions involved that prevent workers from finding the right match. For
example, it is harder for a high-skilled worker to find a high-skill job if only 5% of the vacancies are
high-skill than when 95% of the vacancies are high-skill, even if he/she can distinguish the vacancy
type. This type of search friction is captured by assuming random instead of directed search.
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the low-skilled workers they meet. Therefore, the effective matching rate of a low-
skill vacancy with a low-skilled worker is given by ψϕq(θ), while the corresponding
rate with a high-skilled worker is ψ (1− ϕ) q(θ) . High-skill vacancies match only
with either mismatched or unemployed high-skilled workers, and thus their effective
matching rate can be written as (1− ψϕ) q(θ). Assuming that η = vl
vl+vh
denotes
the fraction of low-skill vacancies, the effective matching rate of low-skilled workers
is ηm(θ), while mismatched high-skilled find a high-skill job with a rate (1−η)m(θ).
Finally, unemployed high-skilled workers can take either a high- or a low-skill job
and thus their effective matching rate is equal to m(θ) (i.e., ηm(θ) + (1− η)m (θ)).
The asymmetric nature of the matching technology generates the following
across-skill externalities and spillover effects:
i) Vacancy Composition Effect (VCE). An increase in the fraction of high-skill
vacancies (1− η) decreases the unemployment-to-employment flow probability of
low-skilled workers, but also decreases the unemployment-to-mismatch flow proba-
bility of high-skilled workers;
ii) Negative Quit Externality (NQE). The higher quit rate of mismatched high-
skilled workers lowers the profits of low-skill jobs. As a result, an increase in the
fraction of high-skilled unemployed job seekers ψ (1− ϕ), which in turn increases the
likelihood of high-skilled workers taking low-skill jobs, lowers the profits of low-skill
jobs. Hence, low-skill vacancy creation declines with higher fractions of unemployed
high-skilled workers, making it harder for low-skill workers to find a job;
iii) Negative Congestion Externality (NCE henceforth).
High-skilled job seekers exert a negative externality on low-skilled employa-
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bility by creating additional congestion in the market, thus making it harder for
low-skilled workers to encounter a low-skill job, and for low-skill vacancies to en-
counter a low-skilled worker. To be more specific, an increase in the number of
high-skilled job seekers
(
ehl + uh
)
, lowers the probability that a low-skill worker will
meet a low-skill vacancy, given by ηm(θ), through a lower θ, and the probability that
a low-skill vacancy will encounter a low-skilled worker, given by ψϕq(θ), through a
lower ψϕ.
In short, an increase in η implies a VCE that benefits low-skilled employability
but at the same time facilitates the transition of high-skilled workers into low-skill
jobs. An increase in the fraction of high-skilled job seekers (both unemployed and
mismatched), given by (1− ψϕ), exacerbates both the NCE and NQE on low-skill
employability.
1.3.2 Bargaining
In equilibrium there are three possible types of matches: (i) high-skilled work-
ers in high-skill jobs, (ii) high-skilled workers in low-skill jobs and (iii) low-skilled
workers in low-skill jobs. The surplus of each match is divided according to a Nash
bargaining solution. The share of surplus that workers receive is exogenous and
denoted by β. I adopt the following standard notation: U j denotes the value of
unemployment for a worker of type j, Vi denotes the value of a vacant job of type i,
W ji denotes the value of employment for a worker of type j in a job of type i, and
finally J ji denotes the value to the firm of filling a job of type i with a worker of type
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j. Accordingly, the surplus of a match can be expressed as Sji = W
j
i + J
j
i −U
j − Vi
and the wage wji satisfies
(1− β)
[
W ji − U
j
]
= β
[
J ji − Vi
]
(1.2)
1.3.3 Timing and Flow Equations
Let e =
{
ehh, e
h
l , e
l
l
}
be the mass of high-skilled workers in high-skill jobs, the
mass of high-skilled workers in low-skill jobs and the mass of low-skilled workers in
low-skill jobs, respectively, at the beginning of period t. At this stage, the Markov
shock hits the economy and a new pair (y, s) arrives that is common knowledge to
all agents in the economy. After e =
{
ehh, e
h
l , e
l
l
}
and (y, s) are observed, production
takes place, exogenous separations occur, and vacancies are posted by firms to insure
zero profits. Search takes place and workers change jobs, leading to the following
distribution of workers in the subsequent period:
e′ll = e
l
l(1− s) + ηm(θ)
[
δ − ell(1− s)
]
(1.3)
e′hh = e
h
h(1− s) + (1− η)m(θ)
[
(1− δ − ehh(1− s)
]
(1.4)
e′hl = e
h
l (1− s) + ηm(θ)
[
1− δ − (ehl + e
h
h)(1− s)
]
−(1− η)m(θ)ehl (1− s) (1.5)
1.3.4 Asset Values
Workers are risk neutral, time is discrete and the interest rate r is constant.
The asset value of an unemployed low-skilled worker at aggregate state (y, s) and
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a given distribution of employment e =
{
ehh, e
h
l , e
l
l
}
is denoted by U l(y, s, e) and
satisfies
U l(y, s, e) = b+
1
(1 + r)
[ηm(θ)E[W ll (y
′, s′, e′/)/y, s, e]
+(1− ηm(θ))E[U l(y′, s′, e′)/y, s, e] (1.6)
Equation (1.6) states that the value of an unemployed low-skilled worker is equal to
his value of leisure b, plus the present value of the probability he finds a low-skill job
times the resulting expected value conditional on the current state (y, s, e), given
by E[W ll (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e], plus the probability he does not find a job, times the
expected value of staying unemployed given by E[U l(y′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]. (y′, s′) and
e′ =
{
e′hh , e
′h
l , e
′l
l
}
denote the realization of aggregate shocks and the distribution
of employment next period, respectively. Similarly, given that high-skilled workers
accept both types of jobs, the corresponding value of unemployment for high-skilled
workers, Uh(y, s, e) satisfies
Uh(y, s, e) = b+
1
(1 + r)
[ηm(θ)E[W hl (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
+(1− η)m(θ)E[W hh (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
+(1−m(θ))E[Uh(y′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]] (1.7)
The rest of the asset values are similar. The asset values of high- and low-skilled
workers in high- and low-skill jobs, respectively, satisfy
W hh (y, s, e) = w
h
h(y
′, s′, e′) +
1
(1 + r)
[sE[Uh(y′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
+(1− s)E[W hh (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]] (1.8)
W ll (y, s, e) = w
l
l(y
′, s′, e′) +
1
(1 + r)
[sE[U l(y′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
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+(1− s)E[W ll (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]] (1.9)
while the asset value of employment for mismatched high-skilled workers is given by
W hl (y, s, e) = w
h
l (y
′, s′, e′) +
1
(1 + r)
[sE[Uh(y′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
+(1− s)(1− η)m(θ)E[W hh (y
′, s′, e′)−W hl (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
+(1− s)E[W hl (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]] (1.10)
Mismatched high-skilled workers search on the job for high-skill jobs. Therefore, the
last term in the above equation represents the value of on-the-job search: given that
the match survives to the next period with a probability (1− s) a mismatched high-
skilled worker can find a high-skill job with a probability (1− η)m(θ), in which case
he gains the expected capital gain from switching jobs, given byE(W hh (y
′, s′, e′/y, s, e)−
W hl (y
′, s′, e′/y, s, e)). The values of opening high- and low-skill vacancies are given
by
Vh(y, s, e) = −c +
1
(1 + r)
[(1− ψϕ)q(θ)E[Jhh (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
+(1− (1− ψϕ)q(θ))E[Vh(y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]] (1.11)
Vl(y, s, e) = −c +
1
(1 + r)
[ψϕq(θ)E[J ll (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
+ψ(1− ϕ)q(θ)E[Jhl (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
+(1− ψq(θ))E[Vl(y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]] (1.12)
whereas the values to the employer of filling those vacancies satisfy
Jhh (y, s, e) = ya
h
h − w
h
h(y, s, e) +
1
(1 + r)
[sE[Vh(y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
+(1− s)E[Jhh (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]] (1.13)
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J ll (y, s, e) = ya
l
l − w
l
l(y, s, e) +
1
(1 + r)
[sE[Vl(y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
(1− s)E[J ll (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]] (1.14)
Finally, the value to a low-skill firm with a high-skilled worker is
Jhl (y, s, e) = ya
l
l − w
h
l (y, s, e) +
1
(1 + r)
[sE[Vl(y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
+(1− s)E[Jhl (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
−(1− s)(1− η)m(θ)E[(Jhl (y
′, s′, e′)− Vl(y
′, s′, e′))/y, s, e]]
(1.15)
where the last term represents the reduction in the value to the firm of hiring a
high-skilled worker, as the latter searches on the job and thus will quit as soon as a
high-skill job arrives.
1.3.5 Surpluses and Zero Profit Conditions
Using the Nash bargaining condition given by equation (1.2) and the asset
value equations described above we can write the surplus functions as follows:
Sll(y, s, e) = ya
l
l − b+
1
(1 + r)
[(1− s)E[Sll(y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
−βηm(θ)E[Sll(y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e] (1.16)
Shh(y, s, e) = ya
h
h − b+
1
(1 + r)
[(1− s)E[Shh(y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
−β(1− η)m(θ))E[Shh(y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
−βηm(θ)E[Shl (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]] (1.17)
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Shl (y, s, e) = ya
l
l − b+
1
(1 + r)
[(1− s)E[Shl (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
+(1− s)(1− η)m(θ)E[(βShh(y
′, s′, e′)− Shl (y
′, s′, e′))/y, s, e]
−βηm(θ)E[Shl (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]
−β(1− η)m(θ)E[Shh(y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e]] (1.18)
The surplus of a low-skill job filled by a low-skilled worker Sll , takes the standard
form: the first term, gives the net flow of output the match generates; given that
the match survives to the next period with a probability (1− s), the second term
gives the expected present value of future surplus; the last term reflects the workers’
forgone search opportunity (i.e., their ability to search for a job) while employed,
and is subtracted from the surplus.
The surplus of a filled high-skill job Shh , takes a similar form. The only dif-
ference is that once high-skilled workers find a job, they lose their opportunity to
search for both high- and low-skill job jobs once employed. Hence, the surplus func-
tion changes accordingly. The surplus of a low-skill-job filled by a high-skill worker
Shl , takes a slightly different form. When high-skilled workers take low-skill jobs,
they can still search for high-skill jobs. The value of this option is added to the
surplus and is given by the third term in the equation (1.18). Given that the match
survives to the next period with a probability (1 − s), mismatched workers search
on the job and with probability (1− η)m (θ) find high-skill jobs, in which case they
gain a share β of E[Shh(y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e] while losing E[Shl (y
′, s′, e′)/y, s, e].
After substituting the surplus expressions into the values of vacancies, given
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by equations (1.11) and (1.12), I define the following free entry conditions:
c =
(1− β)q(θ)
(1 + r)
[
ψϕESll(y
′, s′, e′) + ψ(1− ϕ)EShl (y
′, s′, e′)
]
(1.19)
c =
(1− β)q(θ)
(1 + r)
[
(1− ψϕ)EShh(y
′, s′, e′)
]
(1.20)
These conditions imply that firms keep opening vacancies until the cost of keeping a
vacancy unfilled c equals the expected future profits of a filled job. The conditions
implicitly define θy,s,e and ηy,s,e as a function of the current aggregate state (y, s)
and the current distribution of employment across types of matches given by e =
{
ehh, e
h
l , e
l
l
}
.
1.3.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is given by a vector {θ, η, ϕ, ψ, e} that satisfies the following:
(i) the three types of matches are formed voluntarily, i.e., yaji > b ∀i, j for which
matches are formed; (ii) the two free entry conditions in (1.19) and (1.20), are
satisfied so that the values of maintaining low- and high-skill vacancies are zero;
and (iii) the state variables ehh, e
h
l , and e
l
l follow the flow equations (1.3) to (1.5)
above.
1.4 Simulations
The purpose of this section is to gauge qualitatively the effects of business cycle
fluctuations on job competition, skill mismatches, average match productivity and
unemployment rates by skill group. I consider aggregate productivity and separation
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rate shocks separately in order to illustrate their individual effects and highlight their
differences.
I turn to numerical techniques to analyze the model. I use the free entry
conditions given by equations (1.19) and (1.20) above to find the state-contingent
market tightness θy,s,e and fraction of low-skill vacancies ηy,s,e. I then simulate the
model as follows: first, I generate a sequence of aggregate state (y, s) realizations;
then, starting with the first realization of aggregate state, and an initial distribution
of employment e =
{
ehh, e
h
l , e
l
l
}
I use the laws of motion given by equations (1.3) to
(1.5) to compute the new distribution of employment at the beginning of the next
period; and then I repeat. At the end of each period, I record the aggregate state
and employment distribution and generate series of unemployment rates and labor
productivity along a sequence of aggregate state realizations.
The exogenous variables are set at the following values: β = .5, r = .03,
c = .5, b = .1, δ = .75, ahh = .8 and a
l
l = .45. The matching function m [·, ·] is
a Cobb Douglas function in which job seekers and vacancies are assumed to have
equal elasticities of 0.5. In section 1.5.1, where I examine the effects of an aggregate
productivity shock, I normalize the high value of aggregate productivity to y1 = 1
and set the low value equal to y0 = .9, while keeping the separation rate fixed at
s = .1. In section 1.5.2, I keep aggregate productivity at its high level and let
the separation rate fluctuate between s1 = .1 and s0 = .11. For the purpose of
solving the free entry conditions to determine the state-contingent θy,s,e and ηy,s,e,
the stochastic variable in each case follows a Markov process, with a transition
probability .3. To compute impulse responses to each shock, I simulate the model
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assuming that once the shock arrives it follows a sample path in which it persists for
20 periods, although the agents believe that the shock persists only with probability
0.3 each period.
Since the purpose of this section is to illustrate qualitative implications the pa-
rameters have been chosen in a rather ad hoc manner. However, the results presented
in this section are robust to changes in the underlying parameter configuration.
1.4.1 Aggregate Productivity Fluctuations
In this section, I simulate the model allowing for aggregate productivity fluc-
tuations. As already mentioned, the heart of the model is the skill composition of
vacancies. Hence, I begin this section by characterizing the evolution of this skill
composition. As we can see from Figure 1.1, the immediate effect of a negative
productivity shock is to lower the fraction of low-skill vacancies (η).
Figure 1.1: Effect of a Negative Productivity Shock on the Fraction of Low-skill
Vacancies.
Over time, the initial decline is gradually partially reversed. The reason for
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the partial recovery is the increase in the fraction of low-skilled unemployed in the
mass of jobs seekers immediately after the shock. In response to the increase in
the fraction of high-skill vacancies following the fall in productivity, the fraction
of unemployed low-skilled workers in the mass of job seekers increases, while the
corresponding fraction of high-skilled (both unemployed and mismatched) workers
decreases. These are illustrated in Figures 1.2 and 1.3, respectively. Firms with
low-skill vacancies benefit from the increased fraction of low-skilled workers in the
pool of searchers, because low-skilled workers do not search on the job and thus
provide more surplus than mismatched high-skilled workers. Thus, the change in
the skill composition of job seekers stimulates low-skill vacancy creation so that the
fraction of low-skill vacancies partially recovers from the initial decline.
Figure 1.2: Effect of a Negative Productivity Shock on the Fraction of Low-skilled
Workers in the Mass of Job Seekers.
The conventional result that periods of low productivity hurt the matching
process is present in this model as well. This takes the standard form of a lower
vacancy-job seeker ratio θ and thus a lower meeting rate m (θ) during downturns.
As can be verified in Figure 1.4, the meeting rate follows a pattern similar to the
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Figure 1.3: Effect of a Negative Productivity Shock on the Fraction of High-skilled
Workers in the Mass of Job Seekers.
fraction of low-skill vacancies and for similar reasons: vacancy creation falls initially
due to lower productivity and surplus, then gradually rises, as rising unemployment
increases the worker arrival rate.
Figure 1.4: Effect of a Negative Productivity Shock on the Worker-Vacancy Meeting
Rate.
Although the model delivers the conventional result of a lower vacancy-job
seeker ratio (θ) during downturns, it does not replicate Barlevy’s (2002) result that
recessions stifle the transition of mismatched workers into the jobs they are best
suited for, and therefore increase the degree of skill-mismatch in the market. Instead,
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the model suggests that economic slowdowns generate a reduction in the number of
mismatched high-skilled workers.
Figure 1.5: Effect of a Negative Productivity Shock on the Probability of Finding a
High-Skill Job.
Figure 1.6: Effect of a Negative Productivity Shock on the Probability of Finding a
Low-Skill Job.
The key to this novel result is the VCE described above, namely that peri-
ods of low productivity involve an upgrading in the skill composition of vacancies
(i.e. an increase in (1 − η)). More precisely, the VCE dominates the reduction in
the meeting rate, so that the probability of finding a high-skill job (1− η)m (θ) in-
creases, while the probability of finding a low-skill job ηm (θ) decreases. The paths
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of these probabilities are illustrated in Figures 1.5 and 1.6, respectively. As soon
as the shock arrives, the former increases, while the latter decreases, hindering the
transition of unemployed high-skilled workers into low-skill jobs and facilitating the
transition of both unemployed and mismatched high-skilled workers into high-skill
jobs. Later on, these probabilities partially revert towards their initial values, re-
flecting the gradual recovery in the fraction of low-skill vacancies as firms try to take
advantage of the higher arrival rate of low-skilled job seekers.
Figure 1.7: Effect of a Negative Productivity Shock on Average Match Productivity.
As illustrated in Figure 1.7, these changes in probabilities that occur during
periods of low productivity shift the mass of the distribution of high-skilled workers
towards high-skill jobs and therefore increase average match productivity (i.e. the
average of aji across all matches). This result is in line with previous work that
argues that recessions should promote allocative efficiency (e.g. Hall 1991, 2000;
Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Caballero and Hammour 1994, 1996; and Gomes,
Greenwood, and Rebelo 1999), but rests on a different mechanism: an upgrading in
the skill composition of vacancies facilitates the transition of overqualified workers
into the jobs for which they are best suited. This mechanism is new in the theo-
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retical literature on business cycles and worker reallocation, because it results from
asymmetries in the matching rates of different skill groups that have been neglected
in previous research.
The notion that the lower meeting ratem (θ) during recessions stifles the tran-
sition of mismatched workers into the jobs they are best suited for has been labeled
by Barlevy (2002) as the “sullying” effect of recessions. However, the “sullying”
effect rests on the assumption of symmetry. To be more specific, Barlevy (2002)
focuses only on equilibria in which the production technology is symmetric, the
skill composition of the labor force is symmetric and firms create equal amounts of
each type of vacancy.10 Under these assumptions, neither the distribution of work-
ers across match quality and unemployment nor the number of vacancies posted
varies with skill type. Moreover, this type of framework implies that all workers are
equally likely to form a match of any given quality. Hence, such framework leaves
no room for search externalities and spillover effects across skill groups. Given that
by assumption in equilibrium firms create equal amounts of each type of vacancy,
the VCE that arises in my model during periods of low productivity is not present
in Barlevy’s model. The only effect of recessions in Barlevy is the lower meeting
rate that impedes mismatched workers from reallocating into more efficient uses.
I next characterize the evolution of unemployment rates across skill groups.
10According to the production technology assumed in Barlevy the productivity of a match de-
pends negatively on the distance between the worker’s and job’s skill level. However, an under-
qualified worker is as productive as an over-qualified worker on a particular job, as long as the
distance between the worker-job skill level is the same.
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Figure 1.8: Effect of a Negative Productivity Shock on Unemployment and Mis-
match Rates.
As mentioned in the introduction, the low-skilled unemployment rate is higher and
more sensitive to changes in economic activity than the high-skilled unemployment
rate. The model confirms this observation. Figure 1.8 illustrates the evolution of
unemployment rates of the two skill groups and the evolution of the mismatch rate
(defined as the fraction of high-skilled workers who are mismatched). Independent
of the level of aggregate productivity, the low-skill unemployment rate is higher than
the high-skilled one, because high-skilled workers qualify for both types of jobs and
thus can find a job more easily. When aggregate productivity falls, mismatch in
the form of high-skilled workers taking low-skill jobs declines, yet the low-skilled
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unemployment rate still rises more than the high-skilled unemployment rate. The
latter converges to a level only 0.2 percentage points higher than the original, while
the former converges to a level 0.6 percentage points higher than the original.
The explanation I offer for the higher sensitivity of the low-skilled unemploy-
ment rate to changes in economic activity is conceptually simple but contrary to
the common belief that high-skilled workers “crowd-out” low-skilled workers in a
competition for jobs.11
As illustrated above, periods of low aggregate productivity involve less job
competition and fewer high-skilled workers taking low-skilled jobs. Instead, the
model suggests that high-skilled employability is less sensitive to changes in economic
11Among the studies that investigate the implications of job competition externalities on low-
skilled employability, only Gautier (2002) looks at the steady-state effects of changes in aggregate
productivity. He confirms that low-skilled unemployment rises more than high-skilled unemploy-
ment when aggregate productivity falls, but suggests that this is due to high-skilled workers crowd-
ing out low-skilled workers. This result, however, rests on two assumptions. First he assumes that
unemployment benefits are a fixed fraction of workers’ productivity. Therefore, changes in eco-
nomic activity do not alter the relative net productivities of high- and low-skill jobs, leaving the
skill composition of vacancies unchanged. Second, he assumes that search is directed. Directed
search implies that changes in the skill mix of vacancies do not affect workers probability of finding
a job. Consequently, under directed search the VCE is no longer relevant. The only effect captured
in Gautiers model is that high-skilled workers’ exert a negative externality on low-skill job prof-
itability because of their higher quit probability (NQE), so that when unemployment is higher and
high-skilled workers’ take low-skill jobs more frequently, low-skill vacancy creation declines. The
validity of this result depends on the extend to which changes in the skill composition of vacancies
do not affect workers’ probabilities of finding a particular type of job.
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activity because high-skilled workers can be employed in a wider range of job types
and thus can more easily buffer against unfavorable changes in the skill composition
of vacancies. High-skilled workers qualify for both types of jobs, which implies an
effective unemployment-to-employment probability for high-skilled workers equal to
m(θ), which depends only on market tightness (θ). Low-skilled workers, on the
other hand, qualify for only low-skill jobs. Therefore, their effective matching rate
is ηm (θ) and fluctuates both with changes in market tightness and changes in the
skill composition of vacancies. As a result, during periods of low productivity, low-
skilled workers suffer both the consequences of a more sluggish labor market (lower
θ) and skill upgrading in vacancy mix (lower η), whereas high-skilled workers suffer
only the consequences of the former.
The reduction in the fraction of high-skilled job seekers (both unemployed and
mismatched) implies a lower NCE and NQE on low-skilled employability. Given that
there are relatively fewer high-skilled job seekers low-skill vacancies are more likely
to encounter a low- than a high-skilled job seeker, and low-skilled workers suffer
lower congestion from high-skilled workers. However, low-skill unemployment still
rises more in response to the fall in productivity, indicating that the VCE dominates.
Hence, what is hidden behind the higher sensitivity of low-skilled unemployment is
not job competition externalities but the change in the skill composition of vacancies.
The finding that an upgrading in the skill composition of vacancies facilitates a
more efficient allocation and improves average match productivity following a decline
in aggregate productivity, does not square with empirical findings that match quality
is procyclical. As will be explained in the next section, however, the model performs
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better along this dimension when periods of low productivity are driven by shocks
to the separation rate and thus a high flow of workers into unemployment.
Before I proceed with characterizing the dynamic response to a separation
rate shock, I discuss the robustness of the results presented so far to changes in the
parameter configuration. The results are not sensitive to changes in the relative
productivity of high- and low-skilled jobs or changes in the magnitude of the shock.
A smaller productivity gap between skill types results in a smaller gap between high-
and low-skilled unemployment rates, while larger shocks result in higher dispersion
between high- and low-skilled unemployment rates. However, the implications of
changes in aggregate productivity for unemployment and mismatch rates remain
the same. I also examined changes in the skill composition of the labor force.12 I
find that the relevant variables follow the patterns described above independent of
the skill composition of the labor force.
1.4.2 Job Separation Fluctuations
In this section, I keep aggregate productivity fixed and allow the job separation
rate to fluctuate over time. As illustrated in Figure 1.9, on impact of a negative
separation rate shock, the fraction of low-skill vacancies increases as firms take
advantage of the increase in their relative profitability. Over time, the fraction of
12This exercise was motivated by the work of Pierard and Sneezes (2003) and Dolado et al. (2003)
that suggests the uneven increase in low-skilled unemployment, may be the result of an increase
in the fraction of high-skilled workers in the labor force, which exacerbates job competition and
crowding out of low-skilled workers.
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low-skill vacancies gradually decreases, but remains higher than the original level.
Figure 1.9: Effect of a Separation Rate Shock on the Fraction of Low-Skill Vacancies.
The gradual reversion is due to intensified negative quit externalities follow-
ing the initial increase, which reduce low-skill job profitability and thus vacancy
creation. The sharp initial increase in the fraction of low-skill vacancies, together
with the sharp increase in high-skilled unemployment due to the separation rate
shock, facilitate the transition of high-skilled workers into low-skill jobs while sti-
fling transitions out of them, exacerbating negative quit externalities on low-skill job
profitability. Figure 1.10 shows the evolution of the fraction of high-skilled job seek-
ers (both unemployed and mismatched), which reflects the evolution of negative job
competition externalities (NCE and NQE) on low-skilled employability. On impact,
the fraction declines, reflecting the sharp increase in unemployment. Subsequently
the fraction increases as more high-skilled workers move into low-skilled jobs. In
turn, the rise in NCE and NQE results in a gradual reduction in the fraction of
low-skill vacancies.
To clarify this further, I report the evolution of probabilities of finding a high-
and a low-skill job in Figures 1.11 and 1.12, respectively. On impact of the shock, the
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Figure 1.10: Effect of a Separation Rate Shock on the Fraction of High-skilled Job
Seekers.
first decreases while the latter increases. Therefore, a higher mass of high-skilled
workers is misallocated into low-skill jobs, while the lower probability of finding
high-skill jobs implies that they remain overqualified for a longer period. Over time
the resulting negative job competition externalities lower the probability of finding
a low-skill job, while increasing the probability of finding a high-skill job.
Figure 1.11: Effect of a Separation Rate Shock on the Probability of Finding a
High-skill Job.
Given these changes in job probabilities in response to the increase in job sepa-
ration, the model suggests that a higher degree of over-qualification during recessions
is the result of an increase in job separation and flow of workers into unemployment.
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Figure 1.12: Effect of a Separation Rate Shock on the Probability of Finding a
Low-skill Job.
If indeed recessions are characterized by sharp increases in job separation then the
model can explain the observed procyclicality in match quality. As can be verified
from Figure 1.13, in response to the separation rate shock, average match produc-
tivity decreases gradually, as more high-skilled workers become overqualified, and
converges to a lower level.
Figure 1.13: Effect of a Separation Rate Shock on Average Match Productivity.
The question that remains is whether separation rate fluctuations can also
explain higher and more volatile low-skilled relative to high-skilled unemployment.
One would expect that the shift in the vacancy mix towards low-skill vacancies in
37
response to the shock, and the resulting higher probability of finding a low-skill job,
would improve the position of low-skilled workers relative to high-skilled workers
in the labor market. However, this is not the case. The shift in the vacancy mix
exerts a positive VCE on low-skilled employability, but at the cost of the strong
negative job competition externalities that follow. The evolution of unemployment
and mismatch is illustrated in Figure 1.14. Both unemployment rates increase in
response to the shock, but the low-skilled unemployment rate continues to increase
even further as the mismatch rate increases. Eventually, the low-skilled unemploy-
ment rate converges to a level 1.6 percentage points above the original, while the
high-skilled unemployment rate converges to a level only 1.2 percentage points above
the original.
As in the case of a negative productivity shock, the impact of a separation
rate shock on unemployment and mismatch rates is not qualitatively sensitive to
changes in parameters such as the relative productivity of high-skilled workers or
the skill composition of the labor force. What drives the evolution of mismatch
and unemployment rates in response to the separation rate shock is the increase in
the fraction of low-skill vacancies, following the increase in the relative profitability
of low-skill jobs. In turn, the increase in the relative profitability of low-skill jobs
rests solely on the fact that low-skill vacancies can be re-filled faster once dissolved,
because they can be filled by both types of workers. This advantage is never reversed,
no matter the skill-composition of labor force or the productivity dispersion between
high- and low-skill jobs.
I close this section by discussing the impact of job competition externalities
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Figure 1.14: Effect of a Separation Rate Shock on Unemployment and Mismatch
Rates.
on low-skilled employability. Unquestionably, the negative externalities arising from
intensified job competition for low-skill jobs in response to the job separation shock
harm low-skilled employability. However, the job competition externalities are not
the only driving force behind the relatively higher sensitivity of low-skilled unem-
ployment to cyclical fluctuations. The changes in the skill mix of vacancies that
occur over the business cycle are also important, as low-skilled workers are more
vulnerable to these changes than high-skilled workers. In response to a negative
productivity shock, job competition externalities decline, but still low-skilled unem-
ployment rises relatively more, because of the skill upgrading in the skill composition
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of vacancies that hurts low-skilled employability. On the other hand, a negative sep-
aration rate shock exacerbates the negative job competition externalities on low-skill
employability, but only because low-skill vacancies become relatively more plentiful.
Hence, regardless of the effect of the co-movement between aggregate productiv-
ity and job separation on competition for low-skill jobs, recessions hurt low-skilled
employability relatively more.13
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a model that examines the impact of skill-mismatch,
in the form of high-skilled workers taking temporarily low-skill jobs, on labor pro-
ductivity and unemployment dynamics by skill. I capture negative job competition
13Job competition may actually benefit low-skilled employability by stimulating low-skill vacancy
creation. I simulated the model assuming that searching on the job is costly enough that high-
skilled workers are no longer willing to take low-skill jobs (i.e., separate markets). I found that
unemployment for both types is higher when markets are separated than when cross-skill matching
takes place. The high-skilled unemployment rate is higher in the absence of cross-skill matching
for the obvious reason: given that they cannot take low-skill jobs they have a harder time escaping
unemployment. What is somewhat surprising is that low-skilled unemployment is higher, but the
explanation is also reasonable: when high-skilled workers are not willing to take low-skill jobs, the
value of opening a low-skill vacancy is lower, as the option value of hiring a high-skilled worker
is forgone, resulting in lower vacancy creation and higher unemployment in the low-skill market.
This explanation does not contradict my previous argument that firms with low-skill vacancies
prefer hiring low- instead of high-skilled workers. The intuition is that low-skill firms prefer hiring
low- to high-skilled workers because the latter are likely to quit, but they are still better off having
the option of hiring a high-skilled worker in case they meet one.
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externalities on low-skilled employability, by incorporating into the model the fact
that low-skilled workers qualify only for jobs with low skill requirements.
Previous work has argued that recessions hurt the matching process as firms
post fewer vacancies per job seeker. As a result, mismatched workers who search on-
the-job for better matches remain mismatched for a longer period, aggravating the
allocation of workers into mediocre matches. However, as this paper illustrates, this
is not the whole story. Recessions also involve an increase in the relative number of
high-skill vacancies that facilitates the transition of high-skilled workers into high-
skill jobs, thus bringing down the degree of over-qualification in the labor market.
Accounting for the asymmetric nature of the matching technology, and the resulting
job competition externalities, shows that recessions involve a higher degree of over-
qualification only when associated with higher job turnover and flow of workers into
unemployment. Hence, my model provides insights into skill-mismatch over the
cycle that stress the role of increases in job separation when aggregate productivity
is low. Further, my model explains observed differences in labor market outcomes of
different skill cohorts. The asymmetry explains the relatively low exit rates of low-
skilled workers from unemployment, and their relatively low propensity to search on
the job. My model can also explain why low-skilled unemployment exhibits relatively
higher cyclical sensitivity. The common belief is that, during recessions, high-skilled
workers “crowd-out” low-skilled workers as they compete for jobs. However, in this
paper I illustrate that the higher sensitivity of low-skill unemployment to changes
in economic activity is not due to crowding out per se. Instead, the primary reason
is that high-skilled workers qualify for both high- and low-skill jobs, and therefore
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are less vulnerable to changes in economic activity, because they are less vulnerable
to the changes in the skill mix of vacancies that occur simultaneously.
By highlighting the vacancy composition effect of recessions, which has been
overlooked in previous research, my model improves our understanding of how re-
cessions affect the matching process and the employability of different skill cohorts,
and suggests a closer look at the evolution of the skill mix of vacancies. In addition,
by laying out the effects of aggregate productivity and job separation on the skill
composition of vacancies, I stress the importance of understanding the relation be-
tween the two impulses. Modeling endogenous responses of the separation rate to
changes in aggregate labor productivity as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), for
instance, is therefore, the natural extension of the model. The nature of the model
in this paper requires the endogenous variables to depend on the aggregate state and
also on the distribution of workers across types of matches. Therefore, introducing
aggregate productivity fluctuations alone is a significant contribution and makes the
task of endogenizing job separation much more plausible. Future research will build
upon this contribution by endogenizing separations.
42
Chapter 2
Cyclical Variation in Match Quality: The Role of Unemployment
Risk
2.1 Introduction
Studies show that the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers is higher and
more sensitive to changes in economic activity compared to that of high-skilled work-
ers.1 Some have suggested that this may in part be caused by “crowding out”, i.e.
the phenomenon in which high-skilled workers occupy simple jobs during recessions,
thereby pushing low-skilled workers into unemployment, and move on to better jobs
in booms.2 Existing research has not yielded clear conclusions about the empirical
relevance of such a cyclical pattern in the matching behavior of high-skilled workers.
Hence, its empirical relevance remains a question, the answer of which forms the
basic goal of this chapter.
To this end, I study the mismatch rates and job level dynamics using a panel
of 15748 individuals constructed from the yearly family files of the Panel Study of
1For evidence on the cyclicality of low-skilled unemployment rate, see for example, van Ours
and Ridder (1995). For evidence on the distribution of jobless time and unemployment being
heavily concentrated among the least skilled individuals see e.g. Topel (1993); Bovengerg (1997)
Ashenfelter and Ham (1979); Nickell (1979).
2See e.g., and Teulings and Koopmanschap (1989).
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Income Dynamics (PSID), which covers the years from 1968 to 1993.3 By job levels
I refer to categories of occupations that differ in terms of skill requirements and
prestige (i.e., high job levels are jobs that require more education and have higher
prestige scores than low job levels).
First, to give a general idea of the cyclical patterns in match quality across
different skill groups, I look at how mismatch rates vary over the business cycles and
across workers with different education. Second, I use linear probability and Logit
regression analysis to characterize how the probability of moving either to high- or
low-skill jobs is affected by the overall unemployment rate and the education of the
worker. Third, by adopting dynamic panel data estimation methods, I measure the
effect of the workers’ lagged state (i.e., whether unemployed or mismatched), as
well as the effect of its interactions with overall the overall unemployment rate and
workers’ education level, on the probability of transitions to either high- or low-job
levels. Finally, by modeling the dynamics of transitions as a first order Markov
process, which is heterogeneous among individuals I investigate how workers’ tran-
sitions between job levels vary with skill and over the business cycle. To characterize
the transitions, I adopt a fixed effects multinomial Logit estimation procedure de-
signed by Honore´ and Kyriazidou (2000), which is based on conditional likelihood
maximization (Chamberlain, 1984).
3Existing studies test for crowding out phenomena mainly in Europe. In the U.S. crowding out
as an explanation for the high and more cyclical low-skill unemployment received less attention.
To my knowledge, this is the first study that tests for crowding out phenomena using data from
the U.S.
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The comparison of job level probabilities across groups of workers with different
education years of high employment growth to those of low employment growth
is a common methods of testing for cyclical variation in match quality. Such a
comparison reveals whether workers with a given level of education achieve lower
job levels in years with low employment growth, as the crowding out hypothesis
assumes. Examples are Gautier, Pomp and Zijl (1997), and Gautier (1998) who
separate workers into educational levels and estimate multinomial Logit models
(one for each level of education).
Empirical tests also compare educational levels per job level. Teulings and
Koopmanschap (1989), for example, explain regional changes in the distribution of
educational levels per job level, using regional changes in unemployment rates. In
a similar analysis, Hartog (1992) uses survey answers to questions regarding labor
market tightness of the form: do people with your education, skills and age, in your
area, easily find a job to match this? Others test the crowding out hypothesis by
looking at the flows of filled vacancies. For example, van Ours and Ridder (1995)
test whether lower stock of vacancies and higher number of unemployed job seekers
at the beginning of the period, leads to higher flow of filled vacancies at lower levels.
Their test of crowding out also involves estimating whether the correlation between
the unemployment rate of higher educated workers and the flow of filled vacancies
at lower job levels is positive and significant.
There are considerations, however, as to whether the empirical methodologies
described above are accounting for the cause of the cyclical variation in match
quality if such phenomenon exists. Higher probabilities, higher fractions of high-
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skilled workers, or higher flows of filled vacancies, at low job levels when employment
growth is low, do not necessarily imply that the risk of unemployment induces
workers to accept jobs below their skill level, as they can also be due to other reasons.
For example, changes in the hiring and firing policies of firms (i.e., firms require
more schooling at given job complexity during bad times), or higher turnover rates
of low-skilled can also produce similar patterns.4 Similarly, the opposite findings do
not necessarily reject the existence of over-qualification. High-skilled workers may
accept low-skill jobs to avoid the distress of being unemployed, but higher overall
unemployment may not have the same effect on the behavior of high-skilled workers.
In order to account for this limitation, the main innovation of my empirical
methodology is that it allows for job level probabilities to vary not only with overall
economics activity, but with the workers’ lagged state. In particular, I adopt dy-
namic panel data estimation methods, in which the worker’s lagged state enters the
model as an explanatory variable. By controlling for the lagged state I capture some
4Other explanations include skill-biased technological change, minimum wages, search frictions
in combination with higher turnover rates of low-skilled workers, and incentive structures (e.g.
high replacement rates, high reservation wages) that induce low-skilled workers to search less
effectively. To my knowledge the only study that takes some of these considerations into account
is Gautier et al. (2002). Unlike the studies mentioned above, which restrict crowding out to be an
inflow phenomenon only, they allow for changes in the educational attainment per job level to be
the result of a combination of inflow and outflow policies at the firm level. Hence, they observe
whether upgrading at given job levels is associated with the outflow of relatively low educated
workers or the inflow of relatively high educated workers. Nevertheless, this methodology does not
distinguish crowding out from the rest of the possible explanations.
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propensity to experience a certain job level, which has been previously unmeasured
by focusing only on how overall economic conditions affect job level probabilities.5
In particular, I am able to address whether unemployed high-skilled workers are
more likely to move into low job levels, while mismatched workers are more likely
to move into higher job levels when economic conditions improve.
Although existing studies reach mixed conclusions regarding the empirical rel-
evance of cyclical variation in match quality of high-skilled workers, I find evidence
highly suggestive of it. The mismatch rate of college graduates is higher and ex-
hibits higher cyclical variation than the mismatch rate of workers without a college
degree. Moreover, I find that in periods of high unemployment rate, the high-job-
level probability of college graduates is lower, while the low-job-level probability is
higher. The results of the dynamic panel data regression analysis show that when
the origin state is unemployment, workers with a college degree are more likely to
move into low-job-levels when the overall unemployment rate is high. Moreover, the
results point to the existence of an upgrading in the job levels of mismatched college
graduates when the unemployment rate is low.
Consistent with the crowding out hypothesis, the estimates of the Markov
5In a similar spirit, Teulings (1993) also accounts directly for the role of the risk of unemploy-
ment plays on job level transitions. He follows a different estimation procedure than the studies
described above. On the basis of a number of job characteristics he ranks jobs from the most
desirable to the least desirable and estimates whether higher expected search duration decreases
the probability of finding an attractive job. His results confirm that this indeed the case, suggest-
ing crowding out, but Teulings admits that other explanations may also be consistent with his
findings.
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Chain Multinomial Logit model of job level transitions suggest that the odds of
moving to a lower job level, as opposed to a higher job level, are larger when the
lagged state is unemployment and vice versa. Moreover, I find that the negative
impact of higher unemployment rate on each job level probability declines with
education and more evidently for “mediocre” job levels. Thus, I conclude that
workers of higher education are more likely to accept jobs below their skill level
than become unemployed.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I describe the
data set. Following this, in section 2.3, by grouping occupations into categories using
prestige scores and information on educational attainment, I show how mismatch
rates vary over the business cycle and across different education groups. Sections
2.4 to 2.6, describe the empirical models, estimation methodologies, and results.
Finally, in section 2.7, I conclude this chapter with some remarks.
2.2 Data
Each year the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) asks the head of each
family participating in the study to report his/her employment status, i.e. whether
unemployed, employed or out of the labor force and their occupation. Occupations
are reported using the 3-digits code from 1970 Census of Population. I use the PSID
family files to construct an unbalanced panel of 15748 heads who have been in the
labor force for at least one year. The panel covers the years from 1968 to 1993. I
consider individuals who report being students, retired, or keeping a house, to be
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out of the labor force. Since I am only interested in analyzing movements across
occupational categories and unemployment, I am not considering transitions in and
out of the labor force. Hence, these transitions are excluded from the sample.
Responders also report their years of schooling, which can be used as proxy
for their skill level. A better approximation of skill would be a combination of
education and work experience. Unfortunately, the questions regarding experience
and job training asked in the PSID vary from year to year. I can only use both
education and work experience as a proxy for workers’ skill level, if I concentrate on
a smaller subperiod, in which case, the sample size declines considerably.
To capture the effect of aggregate economic activity on job level transitions,
I use the yearly average unemployment rate as a time varying covariate in the
estimation procedures. I construct the time series of yearly average unemployment
rates, using the seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment rates for the years 1968
to 1993, available from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
I separate occupations into categories (job levels) based on the Hodge-Siegel-
Rossi (HSR) prestige scores, which are conveniently assigned to the 3-digit U.S
Census of Population classification.6 Table A.1 in Appendix A gives a detailed
description of the scores.
6One could argue that the use of the term “job level” is misleading, because I am essentially
referring to occupation and not job categories. It may be the case that workers with the same
occupation perform jobs or tasks of different complexity. Hence, there may be variation in skill
requirements within occupations. The reason I am using occupation and not job categories is
simply the lack of such information.
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The problem with prestige scores is that they do not necessarily measure the
complexity of the jobs or the skill level required to do the job. Ideally, occupations
would be categorized based on their skill requirements rather than their socioeco-
nomic status. Such a ranking could be constructed by measuring workers’ qualifi-
cation in each occupation. However, the PSID is a relatively small data set and the
number of workers within each occupation is sometimes too small to obtain accurate
estimates of skill requirements.7 Although no information regarding educational at-
tainment was used to derive these scores, this caveat is partly surpassed by the fact
that the scores are highly correlated with the level of educational attainment of the
workers in each occupation. Occupations with high prestige scores are occupations
that employ workers with high levels of education.
Table 2.1 illustrates the resulting job levels using prestige scores. Some addi-
tional descriptive statistics of are in Table 2.2. On average, 5% of the individuals is
unemployed and the majority of employed individuals is found in job levels 1 and
2. Only 14% of the employed is found in the lowest job level and only 4% in the
highest.
2.3 Mismatch Rates Over the Business Cycle
The hypothesis discussed in the introduction, and investigated theoretically
in the first chapter of my thesis, is that mismatch rates increase during recessions
7An alternative methodology would be to rank occupations into skill categories using residual
wages. I could regress real wages on education, experience, and other individual characteristics
like and create a ranking based on the average residual wage of workers in each occupation.
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when there is greater congestion in the labor market, and especially among the more
educated who are qualified for a greater variety of jobs. Here I test this hypothesis
by looking at how mismatch rates vary over the business cycles and across workers
with different education.
As already mentioned, in the absence of information on the skill requirements
of each occupation, I group occupations as low-skill and high-skill based on educa-
tional attainment and prestige scores. First, I consider as high-skill, occupations
with prestige score 37 and above, and low-skill occupations with prestige score be-
low 37. Based on this cutoff point, on average, 90% of college graduates in each
year are in high-skill occupations. Then, I consider a lower prestige score cutoff
point, 21, which results in an average of 95% of college graduates being in high-skill
occupations each year. The lower the prestige score cutoff point that divides occu-
pations between high- and low-skill, the higher the “degree” of mismatch of college
graduates who happen to be in low-skill occupations.
Figure 2.1 shows the fraction of mismatched college graduates (i.e., in low-
skill occupations) using the 90% cutoff prestige point. There is an obvious upward
trend. This may reflect the introduction of new technologies so that traditionally
simple or “low-specialization” tasks now require more knowledge and training. We
also observe cyclical variation in the fraction of mismatched workers. There was a
recession starting at the end of 1973 and ending at the beginning of 1975. As we can
see from the graph, the mismatch rate increases in 74. From 1980 to 1982, there were
two recessions, one shorter, beginning in 1980 and ending half year later, and one
beginning in the middle of 1981 until the end of 1982. The mismatch rate obviously
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Figure 2.1: Mismatch Rate of College Graduates (90% cutoff point)
increases during that period. It decreases in subsequent years and increases again
in the years 90 and 91 reflecting the July 90-March 91 recession.
As expected, when a lower cutoff prestige score is used the mismatch rate is
lower. Figure 2.2 shows the fraction of workers with a college degree that are in
jobs below the 95% percent cutoff prestige score. Both the upward trend and the
relationship between business cycles and the mismatch rate are less clear in this
case, but we still observe an increase in the mismatch rate around the years 74, 80
to 82 and 91.
The main assumption of the model in the first chapter of my thesis, upon which
the crowding out hypothesis rests, is that there is asymmetric matching: while high-
skilled workers can be employed in both high- and low-skill jobs, low-skilled workers
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Figure 2.2: Mismatch Rate of College Graduates (95% cutoff point)
do not qualify for high-skill jobs. This is a realistic assumption given that in reality
jobs have minimum skill requirements that some workers satisfy, but some others do
not. However, asymmetric matching does not automatically imply that mismatch
rates increase with education as possible “scarring” effects or career considerations
may prevent high-skilled workers from taking low-skill jobs. If this was the case,
then we should observe similar levels and patterns in the mismatch rates across
workers with different education.
To test this, I compare the mismatch rates of workers with a college degree to
those without a college degree. I measure the mismatch rates of workers without
college degree in a similar fashion. I find the cutoff prestige score that implies
on average 90% of workers without a college degree each year are in occupations
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Figure 2.3: Mismatch Rates by Education (90% prestige cutoff point)
above the cutoff prestige point. The mismatch rates for the 90% cutoff prestige
score for workers with and without a college degree, respectively are in Figure 2.3.
The mismatch rate of workers without a college degree is much lower overall and
relatively constant over time. One the other hand, the mismatch rate of college
graduates is much higher, has an upward trend and exhibits cyclical variation.
If high-skilled workers are eligible for more types of jobs and hence, as shown
above are more likely to mismatch during recessions, the question that follows nat-
urally is whether the fraction of unemployed workers decreases with education and
exhibits more cyclical variation. Is it the case that high-skilled workers, as opposed
to low-skilled workers, mismatch and search on the job instead of staying or becom-
ing unemployed during recessions? Figure 2.4 shows the fraction of workers with
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Figure 2.4: Fraction of Unemployed by Education
and without a college degree reporting unemployed each year. The fraction is always
higher for workers without a college degree. In addition, it exhibits higher cyclical
variation. While both fractions follow a similar pattern, the fraction for workers
without a college degree increases more evidently in recessions (around 74-75, 80-82
and 90-91).
Another interesting question that arises is whether the higher mismatch rates
in recessions are due to workers moving into “stop-gap” jobs as opposed to a general
type of mismatch. Stop-gap jobs are considered to be part-time jobs and temporary
arrangements in low-paying industries. A more general type of mismatch occurs
when workers simply lower their standards when finding a suitable job is difficult,
and accept jobs of slightly lower level, but not necessarily stop-gap jobs. If what
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observed is a stop-gap phenomenon we should expect a higher fraction of mismatched
workers to be concentrated in jobs with very low prestige scores.
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Figure 2.5: Degrees of Mismatch: College Graduates
In Figure 2.5, I compare the fraction of college graduates in jobs with lower
prestige scores to that in jobs with higher prestige scores. As we can see from
the figure, the fraction of college graduates in jobs with prestige scores 37-44 is
higher than the fraction in jobs with prestige scores 21-36. Moreover, the latter is
higher than the fraction of college graduates in jobs with prestige score below 20.
In addition, the fraction of college graduates in middle prestige category (21-36)
follows the business cycle most closely (i.e., it increases in recessions and decreases
in booms). This indicates that workers are mainly taking “mediocre” jobs to avoid
unemployment rather than stop-gap jobs.
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2.4 Linear Probability and Logit Models
In this section, I estimate linear probability (LP) and Logit models to charac-
terize how the probability of moving to either high or low job levels is affected by the
overall unemployment level and the education level of the worker. I consider as high
job levels, occupations above the 90% prestige score cutoff point. Low jobs levels are
occupations below this cutoff point. Moreover, throughout the analysis, I consider
as high-skilled workers who hold a college degree. The model to be estimated is the
following:
yit = β1UNEi,t−1 + β2EDUi,t−1 + β3(UNE ∗ EDU)i,t−1 + ǫit (2.1)
The latent variable yit describes the propensity to be either in high or low job
levels, depending on the question of interest. The variable UNE is a dummy that
takes the value of 1 when the unemployment rate is above 6%, and EDU is a dummy
that takes the value of 1 when the worker has a college degree and zero otherwise.
The EDU*UNE variable is an interaction term that takes the value of 1 when both
the unemployment rate is high and the worker has a college degree.8 The subscript
8I model the unemployment rate as a dummy instead of a continuous variable because it makes
it easier to interpret the marginal effects of the unemployment rates and its interaction with the
education dummy on the probability. Moreover, in the sections that follow, I estimate dynamic
models where whether the worker is mismatched or not, enters as an explanatory variable. By
modeling the unemployment rate as a dummy allows me to ask what is the effect on the probability
of high job levels when the worker is mismatched and the unemployment rate is low (i.e., is below
6%). Hence, I model the unemployment rate in the same fashion here to be able to compare the
estimates. However, the reader should know that the results that follow do not change when a
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i is for individual and t is for time. I model individual effects as fixed. Hausman
tests show that fixed effects are more appropriate, but the results are similar in both
cases.
2.4.1 The Effect of Business Cycle and Education on High- Job-Level
Probability
The results in the first two columns of Table 2.3 show the marginal effects
estimates of the LP and Logit model, respectively, when the interaction term be-
tween education and unemployment is not included in the set of regressors. As
expected, education has a positive and significant effect on the probability of high
job levels. The unemployment dummy, on the other hand, has no significant effect
on the probability. However, the question of most interest is not how higher un-
employment in general affects the probability, but whether higher unemployment
reduces the probability high-skilled workers move into high job levels. To address
this question we need to look at the interaction between the education and the
unemployment dummy.
The 3rd and 4th columns show the results when this interaction term is in-
cluded. The interaction has a negative and significant marginal effect in both cases.
The LP model suggests that when overall unemployment is high the probability
workers with a college degree will be in a high job level next period is approximately
1.5% lower, while the Logit model suggests that the probability is approximately
continuous variable is used.
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5.5% lower. According to the likelihood ratio test chi-squared statistic, which is sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level, the model with the interaction term is superior
to the partial model.
The results are consistent with the view that in periods of high unemployment
high-skilled workers have a more difficulty moving into the jobs they are best suited
for. Although having a college degree increases the probability of moving into high
job levels, when unemployment is high, the effect of education on the probability is
lower.
2.4.2 The Effect of Business Cycle and Education on Low- Job-Level
Probability
The results above suggest that in periods of high unemployment high-skilled
workers have more difficulty moving into the jobs they are best suited for. However,
this does not necessarily imply that high-skilled workers take jobs below their skill
instead. It may be the case they just become or stay unemployed. To clarify this
I also estimate the effects of overall unemployment, education and their interaction
on low-job-level probability.
The results are in Table 2.4. I find that when the unemployment rate is high,
workers with a college degree are more likely to be in low job levels next period.
Having a college degree has a negative and significant effect on the probability. The
effect of unemployment rate, on the other hand, although quite small, is negative
and significant. Again, the question of interest it is whether high-skilled workers are
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more likely to move into low job levels when the unemployment rate is high. Hence
to address this question we need to look at the effect of the interaction between
UNE and EDU.
The interaction of the two has a positive and significant effect. The negative
impact of overall unemployment on the probability of moving into low-job levels is
lower when the worker is high-skilled. Equivalently, the negative impact of having
a college degree on low job levels probability is lower when overall unemployment is
high. The LP model suggests that is approximately 2% lower, while the Logit model
suggests is approximately 7% lower. Moreover, the likelihood ratio test statistic,
which is statistically significant at the 5% level indicates that the interacted model
is superior to the model without interaction term.
2.5 Dynamic Panel Data Models
Individuals’ decisions on whether or not to accept a particular job depend not
only on the overall unemployment rate and their education level, but also on their
state at the time the decision is made. In this section, account for this effect by
including workers lagged state in the set of regressors. In particular, I consider the
following model:
yitk = β1UNEi,t−1 + β2EDUi,t−1 + β3(UNE ∗ EDU)i,t−1 + γ11{yi,t−1 = j}
+γ2[1{yi,t−1 = j} ∗ (UNE ∗ EDU)i,t−1] + ǫit (2.2)
where UNE and EDU are as defined above. The latent variable yitk indicates the
propensity the current state is k, while yi,t−1 indicates the lagged state. There three
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possible states: high job level, low job level and unemployment. Depending on
the question of interest, I model k to be either high or low job level and j to be
unemployment. I divide occupations into low and high job levels using the 90%
prestige score described above.
The possibility of unobserved unit effects, unfortunately makes the estimation
of dynamic panel data models complicated. If a lagged depended variable model is
estimated in the presence of unit effects, these effects are transferred to the distur-
bance term, violating the strict exogeneity assumption. I get around this problem
by following 3 different estimation approaches.
First, I adopt the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) instrument al variables approach
in the first differences of the model. According to this approach the coefficients can
be estimated consistently by instrumenting the lagged depended variable. Anderson
and Hsiao (A-H, henceforth) suggested using the second lag of the depended variable
as instrument. Second, I use a generalized method of moment estimator proposed
by Arellano and Bond (1991), which is based on the same idea. The Arellano-
Bond (A-B) approach, first identifies how many lags of the dependent variables are
valid instruments. Then, it combines these lagged levels and first differences of
the strictly exogenous variables into an instrument matrix, and then, it derives the
corresponding one-step and two-step GMM estimators.
Finally, I estimate a non-linear probability model by adopting Chamberlain’s
(1980) conditional MLE approach. Chamberlain proposed a procedure that specifies
the density of (yi1, ...yiT ) given yi0 and the vector of explanatory variables (xi) for
each i . What is convenient with this approach is that I can use standard random
61
effects software to estimate the parameters. The only difference is that the list of
explanatory variables is expanded to include the include yi0 and xi in each period.
2.5.1 Are Unemployed High-Skilled Workers More Likely to Take
Low-Skill Jobs in Recessions?
I begin with investigating the probability of low job levels. I model k to be high
job levels and j the state of unemployment. With each of the estimation procedure
described above I estimate three specifications. First, I estimate the main model in
which the set of regressors contains only UNE, EDU and 1{yi,t−1 = j}. Then, I add
the interaction term between UNE and EDU in the model. The third specification,
which I call fully interacted model, includes in addition the three-way interaction
term between UNE, EDU and 1{yi,t−1 = j}.
Table 2.5 summarizes the results in three panels, one for each estimation pro-
cedure. The result that education has a negative effect on the probability of low job
levels is carried over in the dynamic model, but the results regarding the constituent
effect of a UNE are mixed. It is insignificant according to the A-H and A-B proce-
dure, but negative and significant according to the Chamberlain approach. Hence,
we reach mixed conclusions regarding the impact of unemployment on low-job-level
probability.
However, unemployment at the individual level seems to be important. With
the exception of A-B procedure, where the effect of LAG is significant only in the
fully interacted model, the other two approaches suggest that being unemployed
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has a negative impact on the probability of low job levels. This result does not
represent rejection of the hypothesis that the risk of unemployment induces high-
skilled workers to accept low job levels. To test this hypothesis, the variables of
interest are the interaction terms.
When the interaction term between EDU and UNE is included in the set of
regressors (second row of each panel) the rest of the coefficients retain their signs,
but in contrast to the LP and Logit models presented above, the effect of this
interaction here is not always positive. The A-H and A-B procedures reach similar
conclusions regarding the impact of this interaction. While the constituent effect
of higher unemployment rate is insignificant, its effect conditional on the worker
having a college degree is negative (although, only marginally significant in the A-
B procedure). Therefore, the results of these two procedures suggest that higher
overall unemployment reduces the low job level probability of workers with a college
degree even further.
In both cases, however, when this term is further interacted with the lagged
unemployment dummy (third row of each panel) it becomes positive and significant,
suggesting that college graduates are more likely to move into low job levels when
they are unemployed and the unemployment rate is high. The results of both es-
timation procedures imply that the probability a worker with a college degree will
be in a low job level next period is lower when overall unemployment is high, but
conditional in addition on the worker being unemployed, the probability is higher.
In both cases, the negative impact of education on low job level probability is weaker
when unemployment is high and the worker is experiencing unemployment.
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The results of the Chamberlain approach are most strongly supportive of the
view that the risk of unemployment induces high-skilled workers to take low-skill
jobs, especially in periods of high unemployment. Not only the three-way interaction
term has a positive effect on the probability, but the two way interaction between
unemployment and education has a positive effect on the probability as well.
The last row of the table contains the results of Logit estimates of the fully
interacted model assuming no unobservable effects. The results are consistent with
the Chamberlain results. Both the two-way and the three-way interaction terms are
positive and significant, while the constituent effects of higher unemployment rate
and having a college degree are negative and significant.
In sum, all estimation procedures suggest the negative effect of holding a
college degree on the probability of low job levels is weaker when the origin state is
unemployment and overall unemployment is high. Moreover, in comparison with the
LP and Logit estimated presented earlier, the dynamic model puts more emphasis
on the risk of unemployment at the individual level. The dynamic model suggests
that what may induce high-skilled workers to accept jobs below their skill level is
being unemployed while overall unemployment rate is high, rather than just the fact
that the overall unemployment rate is high.
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2.5.2 Are Unemployed High-SkilledWorkers Less Likely to Take High-
Skill Jobs in Recessions?
Here I investigate the impact of the same set of regressors and their interactions
on the probability of moving into high job levels (i.e., k = high job level). The
variation in the results across the different estimation procedures is higher in this
case. While most procedures contribute to the conclusion that interactions between
unemployment, either at the aggregate level or the individual level and education
have a negative impact on the probability of high job levels, we cannot argue that
this is certainly the case.
The results of the three estimation procedures are in Table 2.6. In accordance
with the results so far, the A-H and A-B approach, show that the constituent effect
of higher unemployment on high-job-level probability is insignificant. In the Cham-
berlain approach, however, the constituent effect of higher unemployment rate is
insignificant, but when the interaction terms are included, it becomes positive and
significant.
The constituent effect of the lagged unemployment dummy is in general in-
significant. The only case this is negative and significant is in the Chamberlain
approach. However, even in this case, it is significant only when the three-way in-
teraction term is not included in the set of regressors. As can be verified from the
third row of the bottom panel, when LAG is interacted with EDU and UNE, its
constituent effect is no longer significant.
The conclusion that could be drawn from both the A-H and Chamberlain
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approach is that when the worker is unemployed, or when the unemployment rate is
high, does not necessarily imply lower high-job-level probability, unless the worker
has a college degree. In other words, those more likely to have a harder time moving
into high-skill jobs when they are unemployed or when the unemployment rate is
high, are those qualified for high-skilled jobs (i.e., those who hold a college degree).
In the A-H case, the only way higher unemployment rate affects negatively
the high-job-level probability is when the worker both has a college degree and is
experiencing unemployment. In fact, we get the counterintuitive result that the ef-
fect of the interaction between UNE and EDU, although quite small (approximately
1%) is positive and significant. The only way this results can be justified is if this
interaction is actually picking up some of the effect of education. The constituent
effect of having a college degree, as expected, and as the results indicate, is positive.
Comparing the interacted model (row 2 and 3) to the constituent model (row 1) we
can see that when the interaction between UNE and EDU is included the constituent
effect of having a college degree declines by approximately 1 percentage point.
Similarly, in the Chamberlain approach, the thee-way interaction effect is neg-
ative, although only marginally significant at the 5% level, but in addition, the
effect of the two-way interaction term between UNE and EDU on the probability
is negative and significant. Thus, the positive impact of having a college degree on
high-job-level probability is lower in periods of high unemployment.
The results of the A-B approach are different. The effect of the interaction
between overall unemployment and education is very small and only marginally
significant at the 5 % level in the fully interacted model. Moreover, the A-B approach
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gives the paradoxical result that when this term is further interacted with the lagged
unemployment dummy it has a positive and significant effect on the probability of
high job levels. This implies that in periods of high unemployment, workers who have
a college degree, can more easily move into a high job level when unemployed than
when employed. While the A-H results suggest that the positive impact of having a
college degree on high-job-level probability is lower when overall unemployment rate
is high and the worker is unemployed, the A-B approach contradicts this finding.
The strongest support for the hypothesis that unemployment both at the indi-
vidual level and at the aggregate level reduces the probability of high-skilled (college
graduates) workers finding an appropriate match can be found in the Chamberlain
estimates. In this case, both when education is interacted with overall unemploy-
ment and when it is further interacted with the lagged unemployment dummy it
has a negative and significant coefficient (although, the latter is only marginally
significant at the 5% level).
Given the variation in the estimates across the different estimation procedures,
it is useful to take a look at the estimates assuming no unobserved effects. These are
given in the last row of the table. The only significant coefficients are those of EDU
and UNE*EDU. The former is positive, while the latter is negative, confirming
the LP and Logit estimates presented earlier. The estimates of the model with
unobserved effects are also consisted with the Chamberlain estimates. They suggest
that higher unemployment rate reduces the positive impact of having a college degree
on high-job-level probability.
The overall conclusion from this analysis is that there some evidence suggestive
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of the hypothesis that high-skilled workers have more difficulty moving into high-skill
jobs when unemployment is high. However, these evidence are not concrete.
2.5.3 Are Mismatched High-Skilled More Likely to Take High-Skill
Jobs in Booms?
The results in section 2.5.1 suggested that college graduates are more likely
to move into low job levels when unemployed, and overall unemployment is high.
Hence, they support the view that the risk of unemployment induces workers to take
jobs below their skill level. Here, I ask the question of whether this phenomenon is
temporary or not. Do college graduates accept job below their skill level transitorily,
until overall economic conditions improve, and a better job comes along?
To address this question I investigate how the unemployment rate affects the
high-job-level probability of mismatched workers. I consider as mismatched workers
who hold a college degree and are in low job levels (i.e., j = low job levels). As
mentioned at the beginning of this section, this implies that they are in jobs the on
average employ approximately only 10% college graduates each year. In addition, I
model the overall unemployment rate dummy to be the reverse of the unemployment
dummy in previous regressions. UNE takes the value of 1 when the unemployment
rate is below 6% and 0 otherwise. Given this specification, the two-way interaction
term between EDU and UNE, takes that value of 1 when unemployment is low and
the workers has a college degree, while the three-way interaction term between EDU,
UNE and LAG takes the value of 1, when in addition, the worker is in a low job
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level (i.e., mismatched).
The results are in Table 2.7. According to all three estimation procedures being
in a low job level affects the high-job-level probability negatively. The coefficient of
the lagged depended variable is negative and significant in all cases. This result is
not surprising. One cannot argue that being in a low job level as opposed to a high
job level increases your chances of being in a high job level next period.
For the hypothesis to be tested here, the interaction effects of overall unem-
ployment and education with this dummy variable are of most interest. First, we
are interested on whether when the unemployment rate is low workers with a col-
lege degree are more likely to be in high-skill jobs next period (i.e., the coefficient of
EDU*UNE is positive). Second, we are interested to see whether mismatched college
graduates are more likely to move into high job levels next period when the overall
unemployment rate is low (i.e., the coefficient of UNE*EDU*LAG is positive).
Both the results of the A-H and A-B approach indicate that mismatched college
graduates are more likely to move into high job levels when overall unemployment
rate is high. In both cases, the three-way interaction term has a positive and signif-
icant coefficient. The two-way interaction term, however, has a negative coefficient
in the first case and has an insignificant coefficient in the second. Hence, in both
cases, a positive effect on high-job-level probability when overall unemployment rate
is low, arises when then worker in addition to having a college degree, is mismatched.
The Chamberlain approach gives the opposite result. The coefficient of the
two-way interaction term is positive and significant, suggesting that when overall
unemployment is low, college graduates are more likely to move into high job levels,
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independent of their origin state. The coefficient of the three-way interaction term,
on the other hand, is negative suggesting that conditional on a college graduate
being mismatched, the positive impact of lower unemployment rate on high-job-
level probability is lower.
The A-H and A-B results emphasize the tendency of mismatched college grad-
uates to move into higher job levels when the overall unemployment rate is low,
while the results of the chamberlain approach emphasize the positive effect of over-
all unemployment being low on the high-job-level probability of college graduates.
Overall, we can conclude that the results of this regression analysis point to the
existence of an upgrading in the job level of college graduates when the overall
unemployment rate is low.
2.6 Markov Chain Multinomial Logit Model of Job level Transitions
2.6.1 The Model
The purpose of this section is to characterize job level transitions. To de-
scribe transitions between job levels, I adopt the latent propensity framework a la
McFadden (1974). At each period, the latent variable ykit describes the propensity
level to be in state k out of states 0, ....., m for individual i at time t. States are
unemployment k = 0 and five job levels k = 1, ..., m with m = 5. Assuming N indi-
viduals i are observed at T + 1 points in time t = 0, ..., T , the propensity function
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is determined by
ykit = xitβk +
m∑
j=0
γjk1{yi(t−1) = j}+ αki + ǫkit (2.3)
where xit is a vector of observable covariates, 1 is the indicator function, yi(t−1)
indicates the lagged state, yi(t−1) = j if the individual was in state j at time t− 1,
αki is an unobservable individual specific effect and ǫkit is an unobservable error
term. This specification assumes that each individual has a specific propensity for
each alternative depending on the lagged state.
The parameters β = (β0, ..., βm) and γj = (γj0, γj1, ..γjm) ∀ j = 0, ....m capture
how the observed covariates and the lagged state, respectively, affect the propensity
to be in each state. For example, the parameter βk captures how the observed
covariates influence the propensity of being in state k, while the parameter γjk
captures the feedback effect when the state j at time t− 1 is followed by the state
k at time t. In total, there are m2 feedback parameters γ to be estimated.
For the question of interest, the dependent variable ykit is the propensity of
individual i being in job level k at time t. I separate occupations 5 levels, from the
lowest –job level 1– to the highest –job level 5– based on the HSR prestige scores.
Table 2.1 shows the prestige scores corresponding to each job level. The vector of
observable covariates xit includes the education dummy and overall unemployment
rate dummy, as defined in sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
Assuming that the error terms ǫkit are independent across alternatives and over
time conditional on (xi, αi, yi0) and identically distributed according to the Type1
extreme value distribution, the probability of individual i of being in state k at time
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t, is given by
P (yit = k \ yi(t−1) = j, xi, ai) =
exp(xitβk + γjk + αki)
1 +
∑m
l=1 exp(xitβl + γjl + αli)
(2.4)
The parameters β and γ can be estimated based on a sequence of states where the
individual switches alternatives at least once during periods 1 to T − 1. Given that
only (m2−(2m−1)) feedback parameters can be identified, we need to impose some
identification restriction. I follow Weber(2002) and assume that all parameters with
respect to the reference state k = 0 are equal to zero. More specifically, I impose
the following identification restrictions:
β0 = 0
γ0 = (γ00, ..., γmo) = 0
γ0k = 0 ∀ k = 1, ..., m
αi0 = 0 ∀ i = 1, ..., N (2.5)
The problem with imposing parameter restrictions is that it complicates the in-
terpretation of the parameters. For the purpose of the empirical analysis in this
paper, it is convenient to choose unemployment as a reference state, as it makes the
interpretation easier.
The advantages of this empirical methodology compared to the dynamic panel
estimation procedures presented earlier are first, that it allows for the analysis of the
impact of the covariates on multiple job level probabilities simultaneously. Second, it
characterizes the effect of multiple lagged states on this probability simultaneously.
Third, it allows us to compare not only the sign of the effect of the covariates on the
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probability of each job level, but also the magnitude of the effect across different
job levels. For example, we are able to address a question of the following form:
does a higher overall unemployment rate reduce the probability of higher job level
more than it reduces the probability of lower job level? Forth, in a similar fashion,
it allows us to compare the effect of different lagged states on the probability of a
particular state. To give an example, we are able to address whether the effect of
being in job level 1 as opposed to being in job level 2 on the probability of job level
3 is higher or not. Overall, this methodology allows for a more detailed description
of job level transitions.
To clarify the advantages of this estimation methodology, let us interpret the
parameters to be estimated. The odds ration of moving from state j to state k
relative to a movement from the same origin to the reference state 0, which in our
case is unemployment, is given by the following expression:
P (yit = k \ yi(t−1) = j, xi, ai)
P (yit = 0 \ yi(t−1) = j, xi, ai)
= exp(xitβk + γjk + αki) (2.6)
Therefore, a high value of αki implies a high propensity of moving to state k as
opposed to unemployment conditional on any lagged state j. Hence, the parameter
βk represents the effect of the covariate x on the log odd’s ratio.
∂
∂x
ln
P (yit = k \ yi(t−1) = j, xi, ai)
P (yit = 0 \ yi(t−1) = j, xi, ai)
= βk (2.7)
The difference βk−βk′ measures the effect of the covariate x on the log odd’s ratio of
moving from any state j to k relative to moving from any state j to k′. In order to
interpret the parameter γjk, it is convenient to remove the individual specific effects
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by calculating the following ratio:
P (yit=k\yi(t−1)=j,xi,ai)
P (yit=0\yi(t−1)=j,xi,ai)
P (yit=k\yi(t−1)=0,xi,ai)
P (yit=0\yi(t−1)=0,xi,ai)
= exp(γjk) (2.8)
The above expression is identical across individuals and thus, it captures only the
state dependence. According to the expression if γjk is positive, the odds of being
in state k with respect to unemployment when the lagged state is j are larger than
when the lagged state is unemployment. It is obvious that the effects of lagged
states j and j′ on the probability of moving to state k relative to unemployment
can be measured by γjk − γj′k. More specifically,
ln[
P (yit = k \ yi(t−1) = j, xi, ai)
P (yit = 0 \ yi(t−1) = j, xi, ai)
]− ln[
P (yit = k \ yi(t−1) = j
′, xi, ai)
P (yit = 0 \ yi(t−1) = j′, xi, ai)
] = γjk − γj′k
(2.9)
Moreover, by comparing the same origin feedback parameters γjk and γjk′, we can
measure whether the odds of being in state k with respect to k′ when the lagged
state is j are larger or smaller than when the lagged state is unemployment. After
some simple algebra we derive:
ln[
P (yit = k
′ \ yi(t−1) = j, xi, ai)
P (yit = k \ yi(t−1) = j, xi, ai)
]− ln [
P (yit = k
′ \ yi(t−1) = 0, xi, ai)
P (yit = k \ yi(t−1) = 0, xi, ai)
] = γjk′ − γjk
(2.10)
2.6.2 Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimation
I model individual effects as fixed, and pick up the method presented in Honore´
and Kyriazidou (2000). The method concerns the estimation of panel data fixed
effects discrete choice models when the explanatory variable set includes strictly
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exogenous variables, lags of the endogenous dependent variable as well as unobserv-
able individual specific effects.9 Based on the idea applied by Chamberlain (1984),
Honore´ and Kyriazidou (2000) provide conditions under which the probabilities of
the events are independent of the individual effects. This approach allows for es-
timating the individual fixed effects parameters αki consistently. The conditions
are also extended to the case of multinomial discrete choice variables, and therefore
cover the model specified above.
The estimation of the β and γ parameters can be based on the maximization
of a likelihood function, which regards events where the state variable y switches
from say state k to state l or reverse between two points in time, say s and t with
1 ≤ t < s ≤ T − 1. Conditional on such a switch and on the constancy of the
explanatory variables in the following periods xi(t+1) = xi(s+1), the probabilities of
the events are independent of the individual effects.10 Defining the binary variable
yhit = 1 if the individual i is in state h ∈ {0, 1, ..., m} in period t and yhit = 0
9Whether individual effects should be modeled as random or fixed is an important issue in
panel estimation. The latter is more common (Arellano and Honore´, 2001) even though the
specification of the distribution function of random effects is difficult. In nonlinear models the
numerical implementation of a random effects becomes even more difficult as multiple integrals
need to be evaluated. For these reasons, I follow Weber (2002) and model individual effects as
fixed.
10Given this condition, modeling the overall unemployment rate as a dummy instead of a con-
tinuous variable helps increase the number of observations that contribute to the likelihood. An
alternative method to avoid this limitation would be to incorporate the unemployment rate as a
continuous exogenous variable and replace the exact equality condition by weighting the differences
with a Kernel function and giving the observations with smallest differences the highest weights.
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otherwise, the maximum likelihood function takes the following form:
L =
N∑
i=1
∑
1≤t<s≤T−1
∑
k 6=l
1{ykit + ykis = 1}1{ylit + ylis = 1}
1{xi(t+1) = xi(s+1)}ln
exp(D1)
1 + exp(D1)
1{s− t = 1}
N∑
i=1
∑
1≤t<s≤T−1
∑
k 6=l
1{ykit + ykis = 1}1{ylit + ylis = 1}
1{xi(t+1) = xi(s+1)}ln
exp(D2)
1 + exp(D2)
1{s− t > 1} (2.11)
where
D1 = (xit − xis)(βk − βl) + γyi(t−1),k + γkl + γl,yi(s+1)
−γyi(t−1),l − γlk − γk,yi(s+1) (2.12)
and
D2 = (xit − xis)(βk − βl) + γyi(t−1),k + γk,yi(t+1) + γl,yi(s+1)
−γyi(t−1),l − γl,yi(t+1) − γyi(s−1),k − γk,yi(s+1) (2.13)
In the objective function above I impose the identification restrictions given in 2.3.
For an observation to contribute to the likelihood at least four periods of observations
are required and at least some variability in states in the periods between the dates
1 and T − 1.
2.6.3 Results
Estimation results are given for the whole sample and a sample that excludes
individuals with no high-school degree in Tables 2.8 and 2.8, respectively. The
analysis is conducted separately for those two samples to compare the parameter
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estimates and verify whether workers of higher education are more likely to move
into lower levels than become unemployed during downturns.11 The period in which
transitions are observed is one year.
In both cases all the feedback parameters γ are positive, indicating that in-
dividuals are more likely to move to each of the job levels from employment, as
opposed to unemployment. Moreover, the feedback parameters decline the further
the origin state from the destination state. For example, γ15 < γ25 < γ35 < γ45.
Similarly, γ51 < γ41 < γ31 < γ21, and so on. Hence, the odds ratio of moving to a
particular job level with respect to unemployment are higher the closer the origin
job level to the destination job level. In some cases, when the destination state is
to far from the origin state the feedback parameter becomes insignificant indicating
that this type of transitions are rare or impossible. For example, the feedback pa-
rameters when the origin state is job level 1 is positive and significant for destination
states 2 and 3 but becomes insignificant for destination states 4 and 5.
The feedback parameters below the diagonal correspond to movements into
job levels lower than the origin job level, while the parameters above the diagonal
to movements into job levels higher than the origin job level. The parameters to
11Ideally I would like to compare the model estimated on a low-skill sample to one estimated
on a high-skill sample. However, the full sample is too small to allow for meaningful estimates on
high-skill and low-skill sub-samples. The majority of the workers in the sample have at most a
high-school diploma. Focusing only on either college graduates or workers without a high-school
diploma would imply a considerably smaller sample. This estimation methodology, in particular,
requires a sufficient number of across state transitions for the estimates to be meaningful, making
such a comparison even harder.
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the left of the diagonal tend to be smaller than those to the right (i.e., γ21 < γ23,
γ32 < γ34, γ31 < γ35, etc.). This implies that workers are less likely to move from a
higher job level to a lower one than from unemployment, and more likely to move
from a lower job level to a higher one than from unemployment. In other words,
the odds of moving into a lower job level as opposed to a higher job level are larger
when the lagged state is unemployment and vice versa. This finding supports the
hypothesis of interest as it indicates that workers experiencing unemployment are
more likely to move into lower job levels.
The effect of higher unemployment on the odds ratio of moving to each of the
job levels relative to moving into unemployment are given in the last row of each
table. In both cases, higher unemployment rate reduces the probability of being
in each of the alternatives relative to being unemployed. In other words, higher
unemployment reduces the probability of employment, as one would expect. The
crowding out hypothesis implies that workers of higher skill are more likely to move
into lower job levels than become unemployed during periods of high unemployment
compared to workers of lower skill. Hence, the negative impact of unemployment
on the probabilities of being in low job levels should be lower for workers of higher
skill.
Comparing the unemployment rate parameters for the sample that includes
individuals with no high-school education to the one that excludes them, we note
that this is indeed the case. The parameters are still negative in the second case, but
lower in absolute value. Thus, for the more educated sample, higher unemployment
reduces the odds of being employed as opposed to being unemployed next period
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but to a lower degree. In fact, the parameters corresponding to job levels 2 and
3 become insignificant. Hence, when workers with less than a high-school diploma
are excluded from the sample higher unemployment does not reduce the odds of
moving to job levels 2 or 3 as opposed to unemployment. This supports the view
that when the unemployment rate is high, workers with higher education are more
likely to move into “mediocre” occupations than become unemployed relative to
workers with lower education. The parameter corresponding to job level 1 is smaller
in absolute value, but to a lower degree (i.e., it is still significant). This is reasonable
to expect, as the lower the level of the job the less willing one would be to accept it
to avoid unemployment.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter tests the hypothesis that high-skilled workers accept transitorily
jobs below their skill level in order to escape unemployment, and move on to better
jobs when times get better. The hypothesis is tested by studying the mismatch
rates and job level dynamics using a panel sample of individuals constructed from
the yearly family files of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which covers
the years from 1968 to 1993.
My empirical methodology departs from existing studies that investigate the
cyclical patterns of mismatch across different skill groups, in that it accounts for
the effect of the workers’ lagged state on the propensity of being in each of the
occupational categories. While existing studies test the hypothesis by focusing only
79
on the impact of economic activity on job level probabilities, I also incorporate
the workers lagged state as an explanatory variable and use dynamic panel data
estimation methodologies. Modeling state dependence captures some propensity to
experience a certain job level, which has been previously unmeasured by focusing
only on how overall economic conditions affect job level probabilities. I am able to
capture directly the impact the risk of unemployment at the individual level, has
on job level transitions.
I find evidence suggestive of the existence of a cyclical pattern in match be-
havior of high-skilled workers (college graduates). The mismatch rate of college
graduates is higher and exhibits higher cyclical variation than the mismatch rate of
workers without a college degree. Moreover, I find that the positive impact of hav-
ing a college degree on the probability of achieving higher job levels is lower when
the unemployment rate is high. Similarly, the negative impact of having a college
degree on low-job-level probability is lower when the unemployment rate is high.
The results of the dynamic panel data regression analysis indicate that un-
employed high-skilled workers are more likely to take low-skill jobs when the un-
employment rate is high. In particular, the negative impact of holding a college
degree on low-job-level probability is weaker when the origin state is unemployment
and overall unemployment rate is high. In addition, the results point to the exis-
tence of an upgrading in the job levels of mismatched college graduates when the
unemployment rate is low.
Finally, the estimates of a Markov Chain Multinomial Logit model of job level
transitions suggest that the odds of moving to a lower job level as opposed to a
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higher job level are larger when the lagged state is unemployment and vice versa. In
addition, the results suggest that higher unemployment rate reduces the probability
of being in each job level relative to being unemployed. However, consistent with the
crowding out hypothesis, the negative impact of higher unemployment rate on each
job level probability declines with education and more evidently for “mediocre” job
levels. Thus, I conclude that workers of higher education are more likely to accept
jobs below their skill level than become unemployed.
Table 2.1: Job Levels Based on Prestige Scores
Job Level 1: Prestige Scores 6-21
Job Level 2: Prestige Scores 22-36
Job Level 3: Prestige Scores 37-51
Job Level 4: Prestige Scores 52-66
Job Level 5: Prestige Scores 67-83
Table 2.2: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Unemployed 0.05
Job Level 1 0.14
Job Level 2 0.36
Job Level 3 0.38
Job Level 4 0.08
Job Level 5 0.04
Observations 533908
Individuals 15748
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Table 2.3: Linear Probability and Logistic Regression Results: High-Job-Level Prob-
abilities
Depended Variable: High-job-level Probability
LP Logit LP Logit
Variable
UNE -.001 -.012 .001 .012
(.001) (.010) (.001) (.013)
EDU .062 .170 .071 .198
(.005) (.023) (.005) (.024)
UNE*EDU -.014 -.054
(.003) (.019)
Log-likelihood value 6804.4 -6804.6
LR Chi-squared 48.66 56.26
F-test 69.96 53.15
R-squared 0.2711 0.2695
LR test Chi-squared (significance of UNE*EDU) 7.6
Huasman test Chi-squared 2817.6 3067.14 2810.62 3062.19
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
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Table 2.4: Linear Probability and Logistic Regression Results: Low-Job-Level Prob-
abilities
Depended Variable: Low-job-level Probability
LP Logit LP Logit
Variable
UNE -.003* -.013 -.007 -.029
(.002) (.006) (.002) (.008)
EDU -.061 -.140 -.073 -.179
(.008) (.021) (.008) (.022)
UNE*EDU .021 .071
(.005) (.016)
Log-likelihood value -14676.8 -14667
LR Chi-squared 42.44 62.00
F-test 32.32 28.35
R-squared .1526 .1508
LR test Chi-squared (significance of UNE*EDU) 19.55
Huasman test Chi-squared 906.30 603.77 909.45 628.74
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
Starred coefficients are only marginally significant at the 5% level.
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Table 2.5: Dynamic Panel Data Models: unemployment to low-job-level transitions
Depended Variable: Low-job-level Probability
Variables UNE EDU LAG UNE*EDU UNE*EDU*LAG
Anderson- Hsiao IV: -.001 -.044 -.074
(.002) (.016) (.010)
.002 -.036 -.074 -.016
(.003) (.016) (.010) (.006)
.002 -.036 -.083 -.016 .168
(.003) (.016) (.011) (.006) (.045)
Arellano-Bond GMM: -.001 -.039 -.029
(.002) (.016) (.046)
.000 -.035 -.025 -.011*
(.002) (.016) (.046) (.006)
.001 -.038 -.089 -.009* .439
(.002) (.016) (.043) (.006) (.099)
Chamberlain CML: -.146 -.275 -.452
(.027) (.099) .051
-.233 -.469 -.439 .342
(.031) (.104) (.051) (.062)
-.230 -.459 -.461 .333 .384*
(.031) (.104) (.052) (.062) (.235)
No Unobserved Effects: -.106 .926 -.260 .258 .443
(.031) (.100) (.039) (.063) (.196)
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
Starred coefficients are only marginally significant at the 5% level
UNE: takes the value of 1 when the unemployment rate is above 6%
EDU: takes the value of 1 when the worker has a college degree
UNE*EDU: two-way interaction between UNE and EDU
LAG: takes the value of 1 when the worker was unemployed in the previous period
UNE*EDU*LAG: three-way interaction between UNE, EDU and LAG
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Table 2.6: Dynamic Panel Data Models: unemployment to high-job-level transitions
Depended Variable: High-job-level probability
Variables UNE EDU LAG UNE*EDU UNE*EDU*LAG
Anderson-Hsiao IV: .001 .066 -.007
(.001) (.010) (.006)
-.001 .060 -.007 .012
(.001) (.010) (.006) (.004)
-.001 .060 .001 .011 -.146
(.002) (.010) (.007) (.004) (.028)
Arellano-Bond GMM: -.002 .047 .005
(.002) (.010) (.019)
.003 .053 -.000 -.005
(.002) (.010) ( .019) (.004)
.003 .053 .007 -.006* .152
(.002) (.010) (.019) (.004) (.059)
Chamberlain CML: .009 .250 -.310*
(.036) (.105) (.177)
.122 .395 -.284 -.286
(.046) (.111) ( .137) (.074)
.121 .398 -.173 -.282 -.517*
(.047) (111) (.153) (.074) (.326)
No Unobserved Effects: .067 1.145 -.182 -.244 -.389
(.538) (.111) (.140) (.078) (.269)
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
Starred coefficients are only marginally significant at the 5% level.
UNE: takes the value of 1 when the unemployment rate is above 6%
EDU: takes the value of 1 when the worker has a college degree
UNE*EDU: two-way interaction between UNE and EDU
LAG: takes the value of 1 when the worker was unemployed in the previous period
UNE*EDU*LAG: three-way interaction between UNE, EDU and LAG
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Table 2.7: Dynamic Panel Data Models: low-job-level to high-job-level transitions
Depended Variable: High-job-level Probability
Variables UNE EDU LAG UNE*EDU UNE*EDU*LAG
Anderson-Hsiao IV: .001 .065 -.015
(.001) (.009) (.005)
.001 .071 -.015 -.012
(.001) (.009) (.005) (.004)
.001 .069 -.019 -.008 .046
(.001) (.009) (.005) (.003) (.015)
Arellano-Bond GMM: .003 .044 -.119
(.001) (.010) (.028)
.002 .045 -.110 .003
(.002) (.010) (.028) (.004)
.002 .032 -.095 -.001 .010*
(.001) (.010) (.026) (.003) (.005)
Chamberlain CML: -.037 .156* -1.330
(.038) (.117) (.043)
-.021 .081 -1.32 .159
(.049) (.123) (.043) (.081)
-.024 .125 -1.258 .258 -.455
(.048) (.123) (.045) (.084) (.099)
No Unobserved Effects: .056 .739 -1.606 -.001 -.008
(.058) (.115) (.044) (.088) (.092)
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
Starred coefficients are only marginally significant at the 5% level.
UNE: takes the value of 1 when the unemployment rate is below 6%
EDU: takes the value of 1 when the worker has a college degree
UNE*EDU: two-way interaction between UNE and EDU
LAG: takes the value of 1 when the worker was in a low job level in the previous period
UNE*EDU*LAG: three-way interaction between UNE, EDU and LAG
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Table 2.8: Estimated parameters Markov Chain Multinomial Logit model, full sam-
ple, yearly transitions
Destination State Job Job Job Job Job
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Origin State
Job Level 1 1.444 0.581 0.478 0.099 0.116
(0.044) (0.039) (0.048) (0.118) (0.167)
Job Level 2 0.348 1.428 0.615 0.349 0.161
(0.040) (0.034) (0.039) (0.084) (0.136)
Job Level 3 0.308 0.519 1.678 0.625 0.409
(0.048) (0.039) (0.042) (0.077) (0.119)
Job Level 4 0.129 0.293 0.576 1.658 0.613
(0.124) (0.087) (0.08) (0.097) (0.132)
Job Level 5 0.049 0.09 0.544 0.543 1.525
(0.173) (0.141) (0.122) (0.135) (0.161)
Un. Rate> 6% -0.151 -0.144 -0.158 -0.287 -0.238
(0.038) (0.032) (0.033) (0.051) (0.064)
Mean log-likelihood: -0.268
Number of cases: 85481
Number of individuals 15748
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Table 2.9: Estimated parameters Markov Chain Multinomial Logit model, high-
school graduates, yearly transitions
Destination State Job Job Job Job Job
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Origin State
Job Level 1 1.442 0.640 0.421 0.117 0.188
(0.076) (0.064) (0.071) (0.133) (0.182)
Job Level 2 0.369 1.455 0.641 0.339 0.216
(0.065) (0.052) (0.055) (0.093) (0.150)
Job Level 3 0.258 0.500 1.661 0.565 0.438
(0.072) (0.055) (0.056) (0.086) (0.131)
Job Level 4 0.140 0.258 0.649 1.673 0.565
(0.140) (0.098) (0.090) (0.105) (0.145)
Job Level 5 0.109 -0.007 0.503 0.609 1.520
(0.192) (0.157) (0.135) (0.148) (0.175)
Un. Rate> 6% -0.101 -0.0031 -0.082 -0.234 -0.103
(0.056) (0.045) (0.045) (0.059) (0.072)
Mean log-likelihood: -0.26
Number of cases: 53507
Number of individuals 9441
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Appendix A
Prestige Scores
Table A.1: Prestige Scores
1970 Prestige
Occupational Scores
Classification
Codes
Physicians, including osteopaths 65 82
Agriculture teachers 102 78
Atmospheric, earth, marine, and space teachers 103 78
Biology teachers 104 78
Chemistry teachers 105 78
Physics teachers 110 78
Engineering teachers 111 78
Mathematics teachers 112 78
Health specialists teachers 113 78
Psychology teachers 114 78
Business and commerce teachers 115 78
Economics teachers 116 78
History teachers 120 78
Sociology teachers 121 78
Social science teachers, n.e.c. 122 78
Art, drama, and music teachers 123 78
Coaches and physical education teachers 124 78
Education teachers 125 78
English teachers 126 78
Foreign language teachers 130 78
Home economics teachers 131 78
Law teachers 132 78
Theology teachers 133 78
Trade, industrial, and technical teachers 134 78
Miscellaneous teachers, college and university 135 78
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Teachers, college and university, subject not
specified 140 78
Judges 30 76
Lawyers 31 76
Physicists and astronomers 53 74
Dentists 62 74
Bank officers and financial managers 202 72
Architects 2 71
Aeronautical astronautical engineers 6 71
Psychologists 93 71
Airplane pilots 163 70
Electrical and electronic engineers 12 69
Chemists 45 69
Clergymen 86 69
Civil engineers 11 68
Atmospheric and space scientists 43 68
Biological scientists 44 68
Marine scientists 52 68
Life and Physical scientists, n.e.c. 54 68
Chemical engineers 10 67
Petroleum engineers 21 67
Engineers, n.e.c. 23 67
Geologists 51 67
Archivists and curators 33 66
Political scientists 92 66
Sociologists 94 66
Urban and regional planners 95 66
Social scientists, n.e.c. 96 66
Mathematicians 35 65
Secondary school teachers 144 63
Mechanical engineers 14 62
Mining engineers 20 62
Optometrists 63 62
Registered nurses 75 62
Pharmacists 64 61
Clinical laboratory technologists and technicians 80 61
Dental hygienists 81 61
Health record technologists and technicians 82 61
Radiologic technologists and technicians 83 61
Assessors, controllers, and treasurers, local public
administration 201 61
Health administrators 212 61
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Officials and administrators; public administration, n.e.c. 222 61
School administrators, college 235 61
Chiropractors 61 60
Veterinarians 72 60
Elementary school teachers 142 60
Pre-kindergarten and kindergarten teachers 143 60
Authors 181 60
Officers, pilots, and pursers; ship 221 60
School administrators, elementary and secondary 240 60
Designers 183 58
Officials of lodges, societies, and unions 223 58
Postmasters and mail superintendents 224 58
Accountants 1 57
Economists 91 57
Public relations men and publicity writers 192 57
Metallurgical and materials engineers 15 56
Agricultural scientists 42 56
Personnel and labor relation workers 56 56
Religious workers, n.e.c. 90 56
Draftsmen 152 56
Painters and sculptors 190 56
Librarians 32 55
Actuaries 34 55
Statisticians 36 55
Actors 175 55
Sheriffs and bailiffs 965 55
Industrial engineers 13 54
Farm management advisers 24 54
Foresters and conservationists 25 54
Home management advisers 26 54
Surveyors 161 53
Dieticians 74 52
Social workers 100 52
Embalmers 165 52
Funeral directors 211 52
Computer programmers 3 51
Computer systems analysts 4 51
Computer specialists, n.e.c. 5 51
Sales engineers 22 51
Operations and systems researchers and analysts 55 51
Health practitioners, n.e.c. 73 51
Vocational and educational counselors 174 51
Athletes and kindred workers 180 51
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Editors and reporters 184 51
Radio and television announcers 193 51
Writers, artists, and entertainers, n.e.c. 194 51
Research workers, not specified 195 51
Professional, technical, and kindred workers–allocated 196 51
Stocks and bonds salesmen 271 51
Locomotive engineers 455 51
Opticians, and lens grinders and polishers 506 51
Buyers, wholesale and retail trade 205 50
Office managers, n.e.c. 220 50
Sales managers and department heads, retail trade 231 50
Sales managers, except retail trade 233 50
Managers and administrators, n.e.c. 245 50
Managers and administrators, except farm–allocated 246 50
Bank tellers 301 50
Recreation workers 101 49
Credit Men 210 49
industries 281 49
Electricians 430 49
Purchasing agents and buyers, n.e.c 225 48
Bookkeepers 305 48
Insurance adjusters, examiners, and investigators 326 48
Job and die setters, metal 454 48
Machinists 461 48
Aircraft 471 48
Dental assistants 921 48
Health aides, except nursing 922 48
Policemen and detectives 964 48
Health technologists and technicians, n.e.c. 85 47
Agriculture and biological technicians, except health 150 47
Chemical technicians 151 47
Electrical and electronic engineering technicians 153 47
Industrial engineering technicians 154 47
Mechanical engineering technicians 155 47
Mathematical technicians 156 47
Flight engineers 170 47
Tool programmers, numerical control 172 47
Technicians, n.e.c. 173 47
Insurance agents, brokers, and underwriters 265 47
Automobile accessories installers 401 47
Carpet installers 420 47
Dental laboratory technicians 426 47
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Craftsmen and kindred workers, n.e.c. 575 47
Former members of the Armed Forces 580 47
Craftsmen and kindred workers–allocated 586 47
Current members of the Armed Forces 590 47
Musicians and composers 185 46
Secretaries, legal 370 46
Secretaries, medical 371 46
Secretaries, n.e.c. 372 46
Marshals and constables 963 46
Billings clerks 303 45
Bookkeeping and billing machine operators 341 45
Calculating machine operator 342 45
Computer and peripheral equipment operators 343 45
Duplicating machine operators 344 45
Keypunch operators 345 45
Tabulating machine operators 350 45
Office machine operators, n.e.c. 355 45
Foremen, n.e.c. 441 45
Real estate agents and brokers 270 44
Telegraph operators 384 44
Farm managers 802 44
Firemen, fire protection 961 44
Adult education teachers 141 43
Teachers, except college and university, n.e.c. 145 43
Air traffic controllers 164 43
Radio operators 171 43
Postal clerks 361 43
Real estate appraisers 363 43
Stenographers 376 43
Advertising agents and salesmen 260 42
Mail carriers, post office 331 42
Tool and die makers 561 42
Practical nurses 926 42
Photographers 191 41
Buyers and shippers, farm products 203 41
Construction inspectors, public administration 213 41
Inspectors, except construction, public administration 215 41
Railroad conductors 226 41
Library attendants and assistants 330 41
Payroll and timekeeping clerks 360 41
Typists 391 41
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Electrician apprentices 431 41
Engravers, except photoengravers 435 41
Machinist apprentices 462 41
Mechanic, except auto, apprentices 491 41
Plumber and pipe fitters 522 41
Plumber and pipe fitter apprentices 523 41
Tailors 551 41
Tool and die maker apprentices 562 41
Specified craft apprentices, n.e.c. 571 41
Not specified apprentices 572 41
Farmers (owners and tenants) 801 41
Farmers and farm managers–allocated 806 41
trade 282 40
Telephone operators 385 40
Carpenters 415 40
Carpenter apprentices 416 40
Printing trades apprentices, except pressmen 423 40
Floor layers, except tile setters 440 40
Millwrights 502 40
Photoengravers and lithographers 515 40
Pressmen and plate printers, printing 530 40
Pressmen apprentices 531 40
Welders and flame-cutters 680 40
Restaurant, cafeteria and bar managers 230 39
Receptionists 364 39
Cabinetmakers 413 39
Cranemen, derrickmen, and hoistmen 424 39
Electric power linemen and cablemen 433 39
Molders, metal 503 39
Molder, apprentices 504 39
Pattern and model makers, except paper 514 39
Power station operators 525 39
Telephone installers and repairmen 552 39
Telephone linemen and splicers 554 39
Chainmen, rodmen, and axmen; surveying 605 39
Dancers 182 38
Managers and superintendents, building 216 38
Compositors and typesetters 422 38
Electrotypers and stereotypers 434 38
Barbers 935 38
Podiatrists 71 37
Therapists 76 37
Therapy assistants 84 37
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Decorators and window dressers 425 37
Jewelers and watchmakers 453 37
Air conditioning, heating, and refrigeration 470 37
Automobile body repairmen 472 37
Automobile mechanics 473 37
Automobile mechanic apprentices 474 37
Railroad and car shop 486 37
Sheetmetal workers and tinsmiths 535 37
Sheetmetal apprentices 536 37
Boatmen and canalmen 701 37
Clerical assistants, social welfare 311 36
Clerical supervisors, n.e.c 312 36
Counter clerks, except food 314 36
Enumerators and interviewers 320 36
Estimators and investigators, n.e.c. 321 36
Expediters and production controllers 323 36
Mailhandlers, except post office 332 36
Meter readers, utilities 334 36
Proofreaders 362 36
Statistical clerks 375 36
Teacher aides, except school monitors 382 36
Weighers 392 36
Miscellaneous clerical workers 394 36
Not specified clerical workers 395 36
Clerical and kindred workers–allocated 396 36
Blacksmiths 403 36
Brickmasons and stonemasons 410 36
Brickmasons and stonemasons, apprentices 411 36
Forgemen and hammermen 442 36
Heat treaters, annealers, and temperers 446 36
Locomotive firemen 456 36
Rollers and finishers, metal 533 36
Shipfitters 540 36
Structural metal craftsmen 550 36
Tile setters 560 36
Checkers, examiners, and inspectors; manufacturing 610 36
Photographic process workers 645 36
Health trainees 923 36
Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants 925 36
Airline stewardesses 931 36
Housekeepers, except private households 950 36
Ticket, station, and express agents 390 35
Furriers 444 35
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Radio and television 485 35
Miscellaneous mechanics and repairmen 492 35
Not specified mechanics and repairmen 495 35
Stationary engineers 545 35
Railroad brakemen 712 35
Farm foremen 821 35
Salesmen and sales clerks, n.e.c. 280 34
Salesmen of services and construction 285 34
Sales workers–allocated 296 34
Dispatchers and starters, vehicle 315 34
Bakers 402 34
Data processing machine repairmen 475 34
Office machines 484 34
Motion picture projectionists 505 34
Sailors and deckhands 661 34
Bulldozer operators 412 33
Excavating, grading and road machine operators,
except bulldozer 436 33
Farm implements 480 33
Heavy equipment mechanics, including diesel 481 33
Household appliance and accessory
installers and mechanics 482 33
Plasterers 520 33
Plasterer apprentices 521 33
Shoe repairmen 542 33
Stone cutters and stone carvers 546 33
Furnacemen, smeltermen, and pourers 622 33
Graders and sorters, manufacturing 624 33
Heaters, metal 626 33
Milliners 636 33
Stationary firemen 666 33
Railroad switchmen 713 33
Hairdressers and cosmetologists 944 33
Auctioneers 261 32
Cement and concrete finishers 421 32
Piano and organ tuners and repairmen 516 32
Blasters and powdermen 603 32
Dressmakers and seamstresses, except factory 613 32
Meat cutters and butchers, except manufacturing 631 32
Shoemaking machine operatives 664 32
Machine operatives, miscellaneous specified 690 32
Machine operatives, not specified 692 32
Miscellaneous operatives 694 32
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Not specified operatives 695 32
Operatives, except transport–allocated 696 32
Bus drivers 703 32
Truck drivers 715 32
Cashiers 310 31
Boilermakers 404 31
Bookbinders 405 31
Inspectors, scalers, and graders 450 31
Inspectors, n.e.c. 452 31
Roofers and slaters 534 31
File clerks 325 30
Telegraph messengers 383 30
Loom fixers 483 30
Painters, construction and maintenance 510 30
Painter apprentices 511 30
Sign painters and letterers 543 30
Upholsterers 563 30
Fishermen and oystermen 752 30
Sales clerks, retail trade 283 29
Salesmen, retail trade 284 29
Shipping and receiving clerks 374 29
Furniture and wood finishers 443 29
Metal platers 635 29
Mixing operatives 641 29
Painters, manufactured articles 644 29
Drill press operatives 650 29
Grinding machine operatives 651 29
Lathe and milling machine operatives 652 29
Precision machine operatives, n.e.c 653 29
Punch and stamping press operatives 656 29
Riveters and fasteners 660 29
Solderers 665 29
Carding, lapping, and combing operatives 670 29
Knitters, loopers, and toppers 671 29
Textile operatives, n.e.c. 674 29
Winding operatives, n.e.c. 681 29
Fork lift and tow motor operatives 706 29
Transport equipment operatives–allocated 726 29
Animal caretakers, except farm 740 29
Demonstrators 262 28
Asbestos and insulation workers 601 28
Meat cutters and butchers, manufacturing 633 28
Sawyers 662 28
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Conductors and motormen, urban rail transit 704 28
Deliverymen and routemen 705 28
Assemblers 602 27
Drillers, earth 614 27
Dry wall installers and lathers 615 27
Motormen; mine, factory, logging camp, etc. 710 27
Farm service laborers, self-employed 824 27
Collectors, bill and account 313 26
Glaziers 445 26
Cutting operatives, n.e.c. 612 26
Mine operatives, n.e.c. 640 26
Lumbermen, raftsmen, and woodchoppers 761 26
Cooks, except private household 912 26
Millers; grain, flour, and feed 501 25
Dyers 620 25
Sewers and stitchers 663 25
Spinners, twisters, and winders 672 25
Weavers 673 25
Child care workers, except private
households 942 25
household–allocated 976 25
Housekeepers, private household 982 25
Paperhangers 512 24
Oilers and greasers, except auto 642 24
Longshoremen and stevedores 760 24
Crossing guards and bridge tenders 960 24
Stock clerks and storekeepers 381 23
Bottling and canning operatives 604 23
Carpenters’ helpers 750 23
Gardeners and groundkeepers, except farm 755 23
Midwives 924 23
Child care workers, private household 980 23
Garage workers and gas station attendants 623 22
Parking attendants 711 22
Taxicab drivers and chauffeurs 714 22
Busboys 911 22
Dishwashers 913 22
Food service workers, except private
household 916 22
Boarding and lodging housekeepers 940 22
School monitors 952 22
Guards and watchmen 962 22
Elevator operators 943 21
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Warehousemen, n.e.c. 770 20
Bartenders 910 20
Waiters 915 20
Messengers and office boys 333 19
Filers, polishers, sanders, and buffers 621 19
Produce graders and packers, except
factory and farm 625 19
Meat wrappers, retail trade 634 19
Packers and wrappers, n.e.c 643 19
Farm laborers, farm foremen, and kindred workers 846 19
Hucksters and peddlers 264 18
Clothing ironers and pressers 611 18
Laundry and dry cleaning operatives, n.e.c. 630 18
Farm laborers, wage workers 822 18
Farm laborers, unpaid family workers 823 18
Cooks, private household 981 18
Laundresses, private household 983 18
Maids and servants, private household 984 18
Private household workers–allocated 986 18
Construction laborers 751 17
Freight and material handlers 753 17
Garbage collectors 754 17
Stockhandlers 762 17
Vehicle washers and equipment cleaners 764 17
Miscellaneous laborers 780 17
Not specified laborers 785 17
Laborers, except farm–allocated 796 17
Janitors and sextons 903 16
Newsboys 266 15
Food counters and fountain workers 914 15
Attendants, recreation and amusement 932 15
Ushers, recreation and amusement 953 15
Chambermaids and maids, except
private household 901 14
Attendants, personal service, n.e.c. 933 14
Baggage porters and bell hops 934 14
Personal service apprentices 945 14
Welfare service aides 954 14
Teamsters 763 12
Cleaners and charwomen 902 12
Bootblacks 941 9
Engineering and science technicians 162 7
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